

**YOUNIG**

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**WORKING PAPERS**

No. 1

Conceptual framework  
for the study of youth migration  
in the Danube region

Heinz FASSMANN  
Elisabeth GRUBER  
Adam NEMETH



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## YOUMIG WORKING PAPERS SERIES

This working paper was developed in the framework of the project 'YOUMIG - Improving institutional capacities and fostering cooperation to tackle the impacts of transnational youth migration'.

YOUMIG is a strategic project co-funded by European Union funds (ERDF, IPA) under the Danube Transnational Programme. <http://www.interreg-danube.eu/youmig>.

Project code: DTP1-1-161-4.1  
Lead Partner: Hungarian Central Statistical Office

The working paper was prepared within the YOUMIG activity 'Conceptual overview of youth migration', coordinated by the University of Vienna.

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Inquiries can be directed to: University of Vienna, Department of Geography and Regional Research, [raumforschung.geographie@univie.ac.at](mailto:raumforschung.geographie@univie.ac.at) or The Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Population Census and Demographic Statistics Department, [adam.dickmann@ksh.hu](mailto:adam.dickmann@ksh.hu)

Suggested citation:  
Fassmann, H., Gruber, E., Németh Á. (2018). 'Conceptual overview of youth migration in the Danube region'. YOUMIG Working Papers, No.1.

## AUTHORS

**Heinz FASSMANN** is Austrian minister of Education, Science and Research and Full Professor of Applied Geography, Spatial Research and Spatial Planning at the University of Vienna (currently on leave). His main fields of research include the linkages between spatial development, societal change, and the influence of the political system. He is specialised in the field of demography, especially migration, in urban geography and in spatial planning. He has extensive experience on the spatial impacts of the transformation process in the Central European region and was for a long period active as political advisor e.g. as the Chairman of the Expert Council for Integration at the Ministry of Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs.

**Elisabeth GRUBER** works as a research assistant at the University of Vienna since 2012 and completed her PhD studies there in January 2017, dealing with the topic of retirement migration in Austria. Her main interests are internal and international migration patterns and their spatial impact. Besides population geography her expertise includes regional development, demographic change and shrinking, as well as spatial planning in Austria.

**Ádám NÉMETH** is research assistant at the University of Vienna since March 2017 and holds a PhD in Human Geography from the University of Pécs, Hungary. His research interests include the quantitative methods of measuring the dynamics of diversification, the migration processes and the spatial patterns of ethnic, religious, linguistic diversification in Central and Eastern Europe, focusing mainly on the Baltic countries.



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# 1. Introduction

Youth migration is intensifying in the Danube region and this development challenges all levels of administration. The project YOUMIG (Improving Institutional Capacities and Fostering Cooperation to Tackle the Impacts of Transnational Youth Migration) aims at boosting institutional capacities to enhance the scarce local evidence of migration of the age group 15-34 and thus contributing to improved policymaking. YOUMIG, in which 19 partners from 8 countries of the Danube region work together, wishes to support local governments in using the developmental potential of youth migration, which in turn will lead to a better governed and more competitive region.

The partnership of the YOUMIG project covers all migratory profiles relevant for the Danube region. Austria and Germany are the main receiving countries, while YOUMIG also includes the three major sending countries Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia. In addition, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia are involved, where both trends are relevant. Thanks to this composition, the outputs and results of the project will be applicable and transferable to all other Danube countries with similar migratory profiles. Other forms of migration have also become highly important in the region in the last few years. While circular forms of migration (including commuting) have already been highly relevant for a long time, asylum migration has become the prevailing topic in the most recent years.

The document at hand presents the first output of the project. Its aim is to provide a conceptual framework for the project. The framework aims to set a common understanding of youth migration for the different partners of the project to serve as the primary thematic guideline. In this document, we answer the question of how we can define youth migration, and we offer the theoretical background and show empirical facts and figures to prove that youth migration is of significant importance for the region. We explain the focus of the project

# 1. Introduction

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(the kind of migration we look at), explain the importance of policy measures regarding migration, emphasize the local level of political decisions and frame the topic for emigration as well as immigration locations.

This framework is a relatively broad document, since it is a guideline for various work packages within the project. On the one hand, the framework is the base for understanding and further operationalizing and measuring youth migration. In order to do so the project aims to develop better indicators for the phenomena. On the other hand, it is also a guideline for the interviews undertaken in the frame of the project and for the development of strategies and policies. Therefore, it addresses multiple topics and includes different perspectives for different stakeholders. The conceptual framework should be the first step to increased capacities and an intensified transnational cooperation between statistical offices, academic institutions and local governments.

The following chapter explains and defines youth migration and introduces the three main categories of youth migration for our project. The third chapter offers a theoretical explanation of youth from micro-, meso- and macro-level perspectives. The fourth chapter introduces important focus topics connected to youth migration. On the one hand, it presents developmental consequences of youth migration. It also broaches the topic of return migration as well as transnational mobility, diaspora and diaspora policies, the importance of media for youth migration and the topic of diversity and social cohesion. The fifth chapter presents perspectives for policy makers, both for emigration and immigration locations.

## YOUMIG at a glance

**Full name:** YOUMIG - Improving institutional capacities and fostering cooperation to tackle the impacts of transnational youth migration

A project of the Danube Transnational Programme

**Start date:** 01-01-2017

**End date:** 30-06-2019

**Budget:** 2,718,853 EUR (ERDF Contribution: 2,055,179 EUR, IPA Contribution: 255,846 EUR)

**Call number:** Call 1

**Priority:** 4. (Well-governed Danube region)

**Specific objective:** 4.1. (Improve institutional capacities to tackle major societal challenges)

**Project partners:**

**Lead partner:** Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HU)

**Work package leaders:** University of Vienna (AT), Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies (DE), Maribor Development Agency (SI), INFOSTAT - Institute of Informatics and Statistics (SK)

**ERDF partners:** Municipality of Szeged (HU), City of Graz (AT), Institute for Economic Research (SI), Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities (RO), Municipality of Sfântu Gheorghe (RO), National Statistical Institute of the Republic of Bulgaria (BG), Burgas Municipality (BG), Municipality of the City district of Bratislava- Rača (SK)

**IPA partners:** Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (RS), Institute of Social Sciences (RS), Municipality of Kanjiža (RS)

**Associated Strategic Partners:** Statistics Austria (AT), City of Karlsruhe (DE), Federal Institute for Population Research (DE)

YOUMIG, in which 19 partners from 8 countries work together, wishes to support local governments in using the developmental potential of youth migration, which will lead to a better-governed and more competitive Danube region. The project aims at boosting their institutional capacities to enhance the scarce local evidence of youth migration and contributing to improved policymaking with a focus on human capital. Statistical offices and academic organizations team up with local governments in a complex and customized multi-level and transnational cooperation to create local developmental strategies based on improved impact indicators of youth migration and to introduce transnationally tested tools for managing local challenges. As a result, institutions and stakeholders obtain increased capacities through an intensified cooperation.

YOUMIG's work is structured in six work packages (WPs). Aside from management (WP1) and communication (WP2) issues, the thematic work is distributed as follows. In line with the present document, the Conceptual Framework, all partners contribute to the development of improved evidence of youth migration and its developmental impacts on the EU, national and local level by elaborating local status quo analyses for the local partners (WP3). Through a comprehensive evaluation of the locally available indicators of youth migration, the project identifies the shortfalls of measuring local challenges and elaborates and tests new or improved indicators of youth migration (WP4). On the local level, the project improves capacities to manage related processes by jointly testing and introducing good practices and institutional units, tailored to local needs (WP5). The project concludes in transnationally tested tools for all governance levels contributing to better strategies, policies and services related to the issue of youth migration (WP6).

YOUMIG's outputs are being uploaded to  
<http://www.interreg-danube.eu/youmig/outputs>



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## 2. Youth migration in the Danube region – a clarification of the terms

It may seem redundant but it is necessary to define the core concept of the whole project: youth migration. Without a strict definition, everyone might understand ‘youth migration’ slightly differently. In particular, the delineation of ‘youth’ but also of ‘migration’ could be controversial. Therefore, our first chapter focuses on definitions.

### 2.1. Mobility and migration

Migration generally refers to a longer-term relocation of individuals’ main place of residence. Two defining variables of international migration are relevant in this context: spatial distance and duration of time. The majority of definitions of international migration include these two features but differ significantly in terms of their specific use. Regarding the variable of spatial distance, the identification appears to be relatively simple: International migration involves the crossing of an international border. However, the period in which a person needs to live in or leave a country in order to be identified as an immigrant or emigrant respectively still varies to a large extent from one country to another.

The United Nations (UN) (1998: 17) recommend defining an international migrant as ‘any person who changes his or her country of usual residence’. To make a clear distinction between international visitors and international migrants, the UN recommend further, with regard to the time variable, that the

## 2. Youth migration in the Danube region

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change of country of usual residence must involve a period of stay in the country of destination for at least one year (12 months) in order for the person to become an international migrant. In the regulations of the European Commission (EC) the term 'usual residence' is referred to as the place "at which a person normally spends the daily period of rest, regardless of temporary absence for purposes of recreation, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage or, in default, the place of legal or registered residence" (EC 2007). The Commission also considers a period of 12 months a defining criterion of immigration and emigration.

Additionally, as the increase in short-term international movements of people for purposes other than tourism is one of the new features of international population mobility, the UN recognizes the importance of collecting information on some of the persons who spend less than a year in a country that is not their usual country of residence. For this purpose, a definition for a short-time migrant has also been introduced. A short-time migrant is "a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least 3 months but less than a year (12 months) except in cases where the movement to that country is for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends and relatives, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage." (UN 1998: 18)


Short-time stays are often especially relevant for young migrants (e.g. student migration), which is why it is necessary that our study looks at stays that differ from the regulations of the EC and the UN. On the national levels, different definitions exist. In Austria, the '90-days-rule' explains that usual residence accounts for a person who is registered as being within the country for 90 days out of 180. This rule offers advantages for measuring short-time migration. Due to the national differences it is necessary within the frame of the YOUMIG project to follow a flexible approach to who counts as an emigrant and who as an immigrant.

Aside from legal definitions, mobility can also be classified by different motivations and its character when it comes to integration. Within the Danube region, short-term as well as long-term internal and international migration movements can be observed. Additionally, commuting patterns are an important form of internal and international mobility. In the year 2015 refugee migration became an important topic within the region. The YOUMIG project brings into focus the international migration patterns within the Danube region (Figure 1). However, we are well aware of other kinds of mobility as well, such as internal

migration, cross-border commuting, multi-local living (maintaining two households in two different settlements or even countries at the same time), irregular migration, asylum transit migration and so forth.

Figure 1

Classification of mobility forms and focus of the YOUNIG project



Source: our illustration.

## 2.2. Delineation of ‘youth’

Much more so than migration the term ‘youth’ can be seen as a cultural construct linked to societal norms and values. The term varies greatly throughout history and in different regions of the world. Table 1 illustrates various delineations of youth used by international organizations such as the UN or the OECD and by national states. The definitions even vary from one UN department to another. Generally, the transition from childhood to youth begins with puberty and ends with the transition into adulthood. However, it is not easy to define when these phases begin.

## 2. Youth migration in the Danube region

Table 1

### Delineation of youth in different policy contexts in years of age

	<i>Childhood stage between birth and puberty</i>	<i>Youth stage between childhood and adulthood</i>
UN definition	Under 18	15-24 Teenagers: 13-19 Adolescents: 10-19 Young adults: 20-24 Young people: 10-24 <i>(recognizes individual country definitions that also include people up to 34)</i>
EU	Under 18	15-29
OECD	0-15	15-24; 15-34
WHO	Under 19	10-19 Adolescents: 10-19 Adults: Persons over 19
Austria (implemented in the federal laws)	0-12/13 (not every federal law defines childhood)	0-18 Young people/ Teenagers: 12/14-18
Bulgaria	Children – persons below 18 (Law on child protection)	Youths – persons aged 15-29 (national youth strategy)
Germany	0-13	Teenagers: 14-18 Young adults: 19-27
Hungary	0-14 (national youth strategy) Children: 0-12/14 (penal code)	15-29 (national youth strategy) 12/14-18 (penal code) 0-18 (civil code; 18 = start of adulthood)
Romania	0-14 (national youth strategy)	15 to 34 (national youth strategy) 18 (legal definition of adulthood)
Slovakia	Below 15 (criminal law) Below 18 (child protection)	Juveniles: 15-18 (criminal law) Young adults: 18-25 (child protection)
Serbia	0-17 (law on social protection; according to the UN youth strategy)	Youths: 18-25, adults: 26-64; elderly: 65+ (law on social protection); 15-29 (law on youth, national youth strategy)
Slovenia	Under 18 (family code, 2017)	Adolescents and young adults: 15-28 (Office of the Republic Slovenia for Youth)

(Sources: EU Youth Report, WHO; OECD; Austrian Federal Ministry of Families and Youth; Achtes Sozialgesetzbuch BVGVIII des Deutschen Bundestags; Civil Code of Slovakia; Law of Social Protection and National Youth Strategy of Serbia; National Youth Strategy, Penal Code and Civil Code of Hungary; National Youth Law no. 350, Romania; National Youth Strategy Bulgaria)

One approach to define youth is a relational one. Youth can be understood as the phase between childhood and adulthood. Childhood starts at birth and ends with sexual maturity. During this phase, the children are dependent on the care and attention of their parents or guardians. Adulthood is the period when individuals are socially settled, economically independent and begin to start their own broadly defined family. It is clear that childhood, youth and adulthood vary from one society and culture to another and that it can also be further differentiated according to gender, class or ethnicity (KING et al. 2016). It has also become apparent that the transition from childhood to adulthood has changed considerably in recent decades. The general visible tendencies are a prolongation of the transition from childhood to adolescence as well as an individualization of this process (ARNETT 2004). While the transition to youth bears certain social, biological, psychological and economic consequences, it is also interconnected with legal conditions: reaching the legal age (usually at the age of 18), the end of compulsory schooling (usually between 7 and 12 school years in Europe), the right to vote (between 16 and 19) and to get married and other measures of child protection such as the forbiddance of child labour. Not every country offers a definition of childhood, youth or adulthood. In some laws only certain legal matters (e.g. child or youth protection, criminal law etc.) deal with a definition of what a young person, child or grown up is. In some countries, there are different definitions depending on the fields or regional levels. In addition, national allowances (e.g. social security for dependent children, student allowances etc.) differ in terms of age range and are usually available until the age of 25. Sometimes childhood is incorporated in the definition of youth or young people, sometimes there is an overlapping phase and sometimes it is recognized as a succeeding life phase.

While in most laws in the Danube region the legal age of adulthood is 18 (see Table 1), the idea in many cases exists that the phase of youth lasts much longer than that. In this sense, most of the countries are in line with the psychological perspective of the development of youth (following NEWMAN and NEWMAN 2015). In psychology, the phases of development take into consideration the development of identity, social and emotional capacities as well as moral development (see CARR 2016) and can be divided as follows:

## 2. Youth migration in the Danube region

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- Childhood (infancy (0-2 years), toddlerhood (2-4 years), early school age (4-6 years), middle childhood (6-12 years))
- Early adolescence (12-18 years)
- Later adolescence (18-24 years)
- Early adulthood (24-34 years)

Since childhood, youth and adulthood are not variables in censuses, micro-censuses or migration statistics, for the purpose of the YOUMIG project we have had to define a proxy variable based on age. We have chosen the broad definition of youth as persons aged 15-34. This definition includes all possible transitions over the course of life that are relevant for youth migration. We have chosen a broad definition of youth in order to take into consideration the various definitions used in our countries of interest. We set the minimum age at 15 in order to consider the end of compulsory education but also accompanying second generation migration. The maximum age of 34 includes the mean age of giving birth or marrying for the first time, which is reached approximately at the age of 30 in most of the Danube countries. Therefore, the early thirties as a phase of consolidation can be seen as the final phase of youth and the beginning of adulthood. It has to be emphasized that any definition of youth based on age is an inevitable simplification that neglects the social and cultural differences (KING et al. 2016). That is also why this project prefers a broad definition of youth.

The young people between 15 and 34 we have focused on in our project are often referred to as 'Generation Y' or 'Millennials'. Born between 1984 and 1994 (or often more broadly defined as people born between 1980 and 2000), 'Generation Y' has been thought of as the successors of the Baby Boomer Generation (born up to 1965) and 'Generation X' (children of the 1970s and 1980s) (PARMENT 2009). The 'Millennials' grew up with access to plenty of information (television, internet) as well as plenty of chances and possibilities. The emergence of new technologies and a variety of inspiration has created the idea that 'Generation Y' is the generation of choices, communication and individualism. The 'Millennials' differ in their consumer behaviour and have different expectations of their work and family life. That is why in the YOUMIG project we assumed that the migration behaviour of today's age group of 15-34-year-olds would have changed remarkably, since they were influenced by the factors of communication and technology. Improved wealth, the importance of individualism as well as attitudes towards work and life can also be counted as factors for changing migration patterns of today's youth.

### 2.3. The Danube region

The Danube region in the sense of the European Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) comprises 14 'Danube countries'. Nine of them are members of the European Union (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), two are candidate countries (Montenegro and Serbia) and three are third countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldavia and Ukraine). Not all countries are entirely included in the Danube region. In Germany, only the two federal states of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg are considered part of the region. In Ukraine, only the oblasti Odessa, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk and Chernivtsi are included (Figure 2).

Figure 2

Map of the Danube region and location of the YOUMIG partners



(Geodata: EUROSTAT and GADM, Cartography: Adam Nemeth)

## 2. Youth migration in the Danube region

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The Danube region can be considered a migratory functional region.<sup>1</sup> As FASSMANN et al. (2013) demonstrated in the SEEMIG Synthesis Report<sup>2</sup>, due to the historical relations and short distances the international migration trends between these countries have intensified since the breakdown of the Eastern Bloc but particularly since the enlargement of the European Union. Today's youths are growing up with greater possibilities to work or study abroad and are using these chances to a high extent. Within the Danube region we still find very diverse migration patterns. While some countries have experienced tremendous out-migration, others have been considered immigration countries for decades and again others are transitioning from emigration to immigration societies.

Due to a varying permeability of the borders (EU borders, Schengen area, new EU member states and third countries), not all movements within the Danube region have the same juridical consequences. Moreover, the perception of 'internal' and 'international' migration has also changed over time as a consequence of the turbulent history of the territory such as, e.g., the fall of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Aside from our main focus on international migration patterns within the Danube region, we are still aware that there are other kinds of mobility such as commuting, internal migration, irregular migration, asylum transit migration and so forth.

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<sup>1</sup> Incoming migrants from YOUMIG countries to Austria have accounted for 34% of all immigrants. For the Danube region as a whole this amounts to 40%. In total, 55% of the incoming migrants to Austria in the year 2015 were aged between 15 and 34. The age-specific migration profile clearly demonstrates a dominance of youth migration (STATISTIK AUSTRIA).

<sup>2</sup> Apart from Italy (SEEMIG) and Germany (YOUMIG) the project areas comprised the same countries, including Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria.

## 3. Theoretical approaches

The accumulation of life events triggering migration at the age of youth can explain why there is a high prevalence of young people who migrate. Life transitions that can lead to making a new home or changing one's place of residence (connected with work, education or family formation) occur more frequently at younger ages. Young migrants also experience lower migration costs on the one hand and higher migration gains on the other hand. Besides economically driven considerations, young people want to explore the world and fulfil their goals, and they are willing to accept many more risks than the elderly are. Also, differences in the aspirations related to working and studying in an international environment have changed over the last few decades, as have the possibilities and infrastructures for living abroad. Young people are growing up in an increasingly mobile world, where migration and mobility become an important individual strategy for managing opportunities and scarcities (VEALE and DONA 2014, 3). Going and living abroad and experiencing a 'globalization of biographies' (BECK and BECK-GERNSHEIM 2002) seem to play an important part in the transition to adolescence for more and more young people.

However, youth migration is no theoretical exception and can be explained by common and well-established theories of migration. However, certain significant relations between age and the mechanism of migration have to be considered. The following chapter presents these theoretical approaches and specific considerations. It has become clear that different levels of analysis are important, since micro-, meso- and macro-level factors play a role when a migratory decision is made. Here, we present the specific factors influencing youth migration as well as general factors that trigger migration.

### 3. Theoretical approaches

#### 3.1. Relevant migration theories


##### 3.1.1. Revisiting the push and pull model

The individual who decides whether or not to migrate continues to be crucial for migration decisions. The most common framework for the micro perspective is the idea of ‘push and pull factors’ driving a person (or a household) to consider leaving their country of residence and moving to another location. Push factors are circumstances that make it unattractive for an individual to live in a certain place, region or country. Such push factors can be high unemployment, low wages or perspectives that do not promise any change in the future. Pull factors, in contrast, may include high income, favourable job or business opportunities and promising expectations.

The theoretical basis of the model states that all people should be considered potential migrants, if the living conditions elsewhere – especially those related to the labour market – are better than in the current place of residence and the cost for migration is lower than the gain which migration can bring. People evaluate the attractiveness of their place of residence and compare it to other possible places of residences. In this model, the attractiveness itself is the sum of the location factors which are perceived as positive, so-called ‘pull factors’ (plus factors), minus negatively perceived factors, or ‘push factors’ (minus factors), see Figure 3.

Figure 3

#### Push and pull factors and migration constraints: an illustration



Source: based on LEE 1966: 51.

LEE (1966) developed a simple schema of factors and variables that induce migration from which he then formulated certain hypotheses concerning the volume of migration, the establishment of 'stream' and 'counter-stream' and the characteristics of migrants. He summarizes the potential factors that are relevant for the decision making and the process of migration under four headings: factors associated with the area of origin, factors associated with the area of destination, intervening obstacles and personal factors (ibid: 50).

A number of migration theorists criticize the push-and-pull model due to its neoclassical approach which basically treats migrants and potential migrants as rational actors who make decisions based on usefulness factors. It is also criticized for being oversimplified and deterministic in nature and fails to explain the simultaneous occurrence of immigration, emigration, and return migration (CASTLES et al. 2014). Nevertheless, despite its deficiencies, the concept remained essentially a good and easy-to-understand way to feature the motivations triggering migration as a mass phenomenon. Another great advantage of the model is its applicability on both micro- and macro-level analyses and indirectly its clear linkages to official statistics. Therefore, we propose a revised version of the push and pull model as the core concept for the YOUMIG project (see figure 4).

One of the main characteristics of this updated push and model is the inclusion of subjective indicators. It should be emphasized that Lee, the founder of the theory, already stated that a decision to migrate is never completely rational and that not all persons who migrate reach this decision themselves (LEE 1966: 51). Instead of viewing them as reactive individuals responding simply to the economic situation, we should see them rather as persons who are able and ready to take actions in order to improve their lives. Moreover, all of the people evaluate the circumstances very differently depending on age, life-cycle stage etc., thus the situational perceptions of pull and push factors may vary significantly from one individual to another. This issue is related to the concept of subjective well-being, an emerging research topic in contemporary social sciences (DIENER et al. 1999; SELEZNEVA 2016). While economic and social factors (income and status) have long been considered the main determinants of 'satisfaction' or 'life quality', nowadays scholars tend to underline the role of other subjective factors, too, such as health, social life or work-life balance.

When it comes to deciding whether to move or not, the fact is that everyone has their own individual balance of push and pull factors at the place of origin that are different from the push and pull factors anywhere else. 'The


### 3. Theoretical approaches

balance in favour of the move must be enough to overcome the natural inertia which always exists' (LEE 1966: 51), as well as the intervening obstacles. Obstacles can be distance and related transportation costs or legal frameworks which may hinder migration. Finally, there are also personal factors which affect individual thresholds and facilitate or retard migration. In this connection, LEE emphasizes that it is not the actual factors at the origin and destination, but the perception of these factors which results in migration. He stresses further that (prospective) migrants often have lack knowledge about the area of destination, which results in an element of ignorance or even mystery about this area.

HARRIS and TODARO (1970) argued similarly when developing an urban-rural internal trade model to explain rural exodus in developing countries that takes place despite unfavourable conditions in cities of destination as an economically rational choice for individual migrants. Their model emphasizes the importance of expected and perceived benefits of migration. The expected benefits of migration include both non-material and monetary benefits of migration and are compared with migration costs. Once again, information plays an important role when balancing the costs and benefits of migration.

Figure 4

#### Push and pull factors model revisited: an illustration



Source: Our illustration based on LEE 1966: 51

SJAASTAD (1962) revisits the push and pull model and views migration equally as training and an investment in human capital. According to his approach, individuals calculate the difference between the expected incomes in the country

of origin and in the country of destination over the remaining working years and put it in relation to the migration costs. If the expected income gains (returns) are bigger than the migration costs (which also include psychological costs), and if there are still enough years until retirement, it is not only probable but in fact rational to migrate. KALTER (1997) argues similarly with the subjective expected utility theory (SEU-theory): If the expected utility defined by a variable multiplied with their specific probability of being realized (for example: How sure can I be to earn higher wages?) exceeds a certain threshold, then migration will be realized. Human capital characteristics like age, family status, sex and professional status of individuals are also key factors in this evaluation of returns and costs.

### ***3.1.2. Theoretical enhancements for the meso and macro-levels***

While the push and pull theory is the main theory for explaining why young people migrate, other theories also need to be mentioned at this point to explain the interconnection of individuals, families and households as well as the linkages between the macro-, meso- and micro-level. By adding a macro-perspective and a meso-perspective factors that enable or hinder the migration decision can be framed.

#### *New economics of labour migration*

Although youth migration often is a more individual decision than migration in other stages of one's life course, 'migration decisions are often not made by isolated individuals, but usually by families or households' (CASTLES et al. 2014: 38). The idea of a household and family approach was mainly promoted by the 'new economics of labour migration' approach (NELM) and presents another relativization of the pure neoclassical approach to individual migration behaviour. This perspective can further explain the interplay between family members who migrated and those who stayed at home. It sees individuals as active agents and not as passive victims of macro-structures that push or pull them towards migration. The livelihood approach offers a similar perspective by focussing on individual agents, who are trying to improve their lives (ibid.).

#### *The migration systems theory*

This theory of human migration combines macro-, meso- and micro-level factors to produce more inclusive explanations. It is premised on the observation

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that most international migration occurs within systems or countries linked by geographical, economic, colonial or other historical relations. This framework is important for the YOUMIG project.

Historical-structural approaches take this into consideration and describe migration embedded in a macro-system where a cheap labour force is recruited in less developed countries and exploited in more developed countries. However, this deterministic perspective underestimates the migrants' will to make choices and displays them as victims of a global market and new possibilities (CASTLES et al. 2014).

A certain influence of macro-economic factors on migration cannot be neglected. In the hypothesis of mobility transition ZELINSKY (1971) described how migration patterns change over time with the change of economic and political systems. The second half of the 20th century provided a host of empirical evidence on the model of migration transition (KATUS 1990; FASSMANN and REEGER 2012; FASSMANN et al. 2013), particularly in cases where typical emigration countries became countries of mass immigration. The importance of geographical inequalities, the structure of labour markets and the nature of interstate relationships play a crucial role in the dynamic changes of migration patterns.

Not only structures on the macro-level, but also on the meso-level influence migration possibilities and decisions. The importance of family and community dynamics, referred to as 'social networks', has been recognized in migration studies. The idea of the so-called 'meso-level' as an intermediate factor between individual decisions and macrostructures has since gained importance when it comes to explaining the decision to move and where to move to. The following meso-level factors are important:

- Networks and family ties play an essential role, also for young migrants, in getting to know about possibilities to work, study or live in a foreign country. The emergence of online social networks has further increased the importance of these factors.
- Migration steering institutions like the IOM, the UNHCR but also national policies (including financial aids like grants, scholarships);
- Local policies or governance for retaining the population or attracting migration (including also enterprises and other stakeholders active in the recruitment process)

Also cultural and linguistic factors play an important role in migration decisions. Cultural differences create barriers implying "costs that potential migrants

likely consider in deciding whether to migrate and where to go” (ADSERÀ 2015: 1), and may hinder the full realization of the potential economic gains from international mobility. The knowledge of culture, language, political systems etc. of the host country facilitate the transfer of migrants’ skills to the new labour market and provides an additional advantage for them (ibid.). Moreover, the existence of large immigrant communities (ethnic and/or linguistic enclaves) may encourage further moves and decrease migration costs for new immigrants through offering practical information and psychological support (PEDERSEN et al. 2008).

### **3.2. The Life course: an anchor for a typology of youth migration**

Although every person follows her or his own individual course of life and changes of residency are driven by different motivations within the age group of 15-34, there are systematic principles that govern the timing of events during the phase of youth (WINGENS et al. 2011). In chapter 3.1., we said that migration is influenced by factors on the micro-, meso- and macro-levels, which can also be understood as factors and events structuring the life course. For instance, the start of tertiary education or vocational training is mainly pre-defined by legal requirements such as compulsory schooling.

In its earlier form the life course model was implicitly based on a timetable of education and employment of men only (KOHLE 1986); women were given no separate attention. In the last few decades, more and more studies have underlined the significant variety in the life courses of different individuals and genders (ALLAT et al. 1987; KATZ and MONK 1993 etc.). Life course patterns of women usually differ due to childbirth and child care and, therefore, the participation in the labour market as well as in other forms of caregiving, such as nursing elderly parents, often double in number through marriage (KRÜGER and BALDUS 1999). Needless to say, the gender-specific differences in life courses can also have different effects on migration patterns of young men and women.

#### **3.2.1. Transitions structuring the life course**

KING et al. (2016) described three significant life course transitions in young ages that trigger mobility: the transition from school or higher education to work, the transition from unemployment to employment and the transition from living at home to living independently. The latter transition describes the estab-

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lishment of one's own 'home', which is often connected with partnership formation or having children, and it is the last transition before adulthood. The three transitions can be generally seen to subsequently follow each other, although not every young person necessarily will go through all transitions.

- *Education-induced youth migration* can take place on different levels of educational attainment and over different regional or national boundaries. High mobility mostly occurs in connection with tertiary educational attainment in the form of both internal and international movements (HINTON 2011, WATERS et al. 2011). Local or regional borders can also be crossed in order to attend secondary education (schools or colleges) (SMITH and HIGHLEY 2012). Receiving vocational training or other forms of education might also necessitate a change of residency.
- *Labour-motivated youth migration* in many cases serves as a strategy for handling increasing labour market insecurity as well as weak employment opportunities and for overcoming payment differentials between different regions. Within the European context the accession to the European market has influenced employment opportunities. Labour-motivated youth migration can be observed internationally as well as internally.
- *Family formation* events such as marriage, partnership union, cohabitation or giving birth often trigger internal migration in particular. Families show a different migration pattern when compared to younger migrants; for example, they often prefer living on the outskirts of cities. Family formation can also be observed as a factor in return migration, since living close to one's kin such as the grandparents offers care opportunities.


Transitions within a life course are milestones in the transition from youth to adulthood. Motivations to migrate are often connected to the idea of using these transitions to better one's own living situation. Decisions to move are further influenced by biological factors (e.g. gender), socio-economic factors (e.g. capital), personal factors and the migration biography. While for some young people studying or working abroad is considered a lifestyle option, for others it is a risk they take with the hope of enjoying the chance of a more prosperous life in the future. All transitions can be a migration trigger (emigration/immigration), and return migration is also possible after the first move. Return migration is not solely connected with youth migration, but can also be a possible movement of post-students in transition from education to the labour market (see chapter 4.2). Let us look at the three forms of migration listed above more closely.

### 3.2.2. Migration over the life course: less costs and more profit

Aside from the general ideas of migration theory we presented above, youth migration can be explained further by taking the life course of a potential migrant into consideration. BAUER and ZIMMERMANN (1999) summarize the assumptions and the effects of the push and pull model and the related but modified models in the following way. The likelihood of migration decreases with age, which reflects the smaller expected lifetime gain from moving for elderly people. On the other hand, individuals with higher education usually exhibit a higher migration probability because more highly educated people find new jobs more easily and the ability to collect and process information gained through higher education reduces the risks of migration.

In fact, the age-specific distribution of migrants peaks at the age when secondary education is completed (which in most of the European countries is between 16 and 20 years of age), when tertiary education is started or when entering the labour market. Young children also show a higher mobility rate when family migration occurs (Figure 5). These patterns become visible when observing both internal and international migration, depending on which forms of migration are predominant.

Figure 5



Source: based on BERNARD et al. 2014, modified.

These patterns are connected with biological and structural features such as the age of leaving school, the age of entering the labour market and the age of

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retirement, the mean age of giving birth for the first time, the mean age of marriage and so forth. Therefore, the life course has some structural influence on migration behaviour. CASTRO and ROGERS (1981) were among the first to identify these regularities.

Consequently, the majority of migrants are young, retirement migrants are rare. “More than ever, young people move. Over the past few decades, political, economic, social and demographic movements changes in many parts of the world have uprooted many people and stimulated migrations to cities and abroad” (UNFPA 2006). To explain this uneven age distribution of migrants it is necessary to emphasize certain specific factors within the general push and pull model.

One reason for the unequal age distribution of migrants is the different and age-specific gain of migration.

- Young migrants gain much more when they migrate to a high-wage region simply because they live longer and are able to maximize their life-long income. The expected working years of an elderly migrant are fewer than those of a younger migrant.
- This argument also holds true for student migration. Tertiary education can be seen as one step before entering the labour market. When young migrants go and study abroad the probability to find a job in a high-wage region is higher. A student migrant can be seen as an “ideal” migrant, who is socialized in the target country and highly qualified.

In contrast to the higher gains, the migration costs for younger migrants are lower when compared to the costs of elderly migrants. This can be explained by demographic, social and psychological factors.

- The probability that young migrants are single is higher and migrating without a family is cheaper and easier to organize.
- Young migrants have a greater ability to adapt to a new situation and they can learn a new language more easily.
- Young people are trained in modern communication technology, which in turn is crucial for gathering information and lowering transaction costs.

#### 3.3. A life course specific migration typology

Following the transitions described above, three principal types of youth migration can be differentiated: education-orientated youth migration, labour-orientated youth migration, and retirement-orientated youth migration.

tated youth migration and family or reunion migration. International migration is not necessarily a consequence of one of these transitions but can be involved as a form of mobility.

### **3.3.1. *International students***

The number of international students is rising worldwide (GMG 2014). Not only Erasmus mobility schemes, but also the expansion of study programmes taught in English and the development of the university sector as a global market have led to a prevalence of studying abroad for at least a certain period of time (KING et al. 2016). Going abroad to study can be the beginning of an international career or the start of a longer time living abroad, and similarly it can be a strategy for envisaging an improvement of job opportunities back home.

Education-orientated migrants are not easy to identify and follow statistically, since there are different subtypes and insufficient statistical data sources (ibid.). Defining an international student can be difficult because citizenship, birthplace or prior residency cannot be sufficiently identified. Furthermore, most students do not consider themselves migrants and also fail to register themselves, even if their study visit takes longer than 3 months, which would be counted as a short-time migration according to the UN definition.

Different subtypes of international students can be identified (KING and FINDLAY 2012). In most cases when talking about international students, they are enrolled in tertiary education (university, colleges or similar institutions) but of course international migration of secondary school students is also possible (especially in border regions). University students can be differentiated in terms of 'credit mobility' (students who only take individual courses or experience only several semesters abroad) or in terms of 'degree or diploma mobility' (students who go abroad for a whole study programme, such as a master's degree or a doctorate). Post graduates show a particularly high level of degree mobility, since the experience of studying in a foreign country tends to become more and more obligatory for certain high-skilled jobs, especially in the academic sector. Student mobility can therefore also be seen as a form of high-skilled migration. From a different viewpoint, it can be described as a type of youth mobility culture. In this sense living and studying abroad can be understood as the consumption of adventure and lifestyle rather than an economic strategy.

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#### 3.3.2. *Young labour migrants*

Young labour migrants can be classified according to the level and transferability of their skills (education, occupation). From this point of view, migrating to another country for the purpose of employment can be undertaken in order to a) find a manual labour job which mainly requires physical strength, b) find a job that requires secondary-level education as well as certain qualifications and experience (typically jobs, e.g., in mechanics or health care), c) accept a job that requires lower skills than the migrant actually has but that are not recognized or cannot be used due to language barriers, d) learn on the job and improve one's qualifications and e) have a career in a high-skilled job market (KING et al. 2016).

Not only the types of labour migration but also the motivation behind them can differ, since there are multiple transitions that labour migration can offer (e.g. the transition from unemployment to employment, from one job to another or from education to employment) (Ibid.). Youth unemployment, precarious or part-time employment and the aspiration after better opportunities in a different country might be push factors that lead to a transnational move. Further, the wage level plays a crucial role in deciding to migrate. Especially for type c), taking on lower-skilled work abroad, low wages in the country of origin can lead to this decision. Wage differentials might also attract 'target earners', who take on employment for a certain period of time in order to prepare their transition into family union by being able to buy, build or renovate a house or an apartment after returning from their employment abroad (Ibid.).

In many cases higher-skilled migration is not only linked to economic factors and therefore comparable with international student mobility. RECCHI and FAVELL (2009) describe the search for adventure, making new experiences, learning a language, escaping the norms of domestic society and lifestyle factors as almost as important as economic factors such as high salaries and better employment opportunities. Aside from target earners and career seekers, so-called 'drifters' (who migrate mainly to travel and live in a global city) are another type of high-skilled migrant (TREVENA 2013). Still living in societies with rather limited career opportunities, the economic factors remain more important. In general, high-skilled labour migrants are young and independent, free from family obligation and without any well-defined plans. Young migrants in lower-skilled occupations show a high level of trust in social and familial networks, also when it comes to finding employment and accommodation abroad (KING et al. 2016).

### **3.3.3. Family formation and migration**

When applying this project's broad definition of youth migration, the process of family formation and consequently family-induced migration is also part of the process. Partnership formation, marriage and childbearing usually happen in the transitional phase from youth to adulthood and have a great impact on choosing a place of residence and therefore also on migration. Further, migration can indirectly affect families, when, e.g., individual members of a union change their residency, which leads to transnational families or partnerships or to families left behind. Also, moving partners or young families to a new country of destination affects their children or future children, who become the second generation or children with indirect migration background.

Originally, the term 'family migration' was used as a general concept covering family reunification and the migration of a family unit as a whole. However, defining the term has become more difficult in the last few years due to new forms of families emerging. There has been a recent decline of traditional married couples with children, and new forms of families such as single-mothers and fathers, patchwork families, families without children, cohabitating couples and same-sex couples have become more frequent and therefore relevant. Further, the focus on family migration was broadened by taking into account how migration affects family members who do not migrate.

In general, families are less likely to migrate when they are consolidated, which is due to the fact that the migration costs are higher for families than they are for singles (KULU and MILEWSKI 2007). Further, families with children show different mobility patterns depending on the age of the children. At the beginning of married life and having children, the probability of moving is relatively high. Mobility also rises when the children have reached the pre-school age, and this is followed by a phase of greater stability. After the children finish school or leave home, mobility increases again (NIVALAINEN 2004). The YOU-MIG project focuses only indirectly on later instances of family migration.

While family migration was originally described as a topic that is mostly concerned with internal migration patterns in times of globalization, an increase in travel, language competences and studying abroad have led to a higher relevance of international family migration. As KING (2002) pointed out, love migration or a 'transnationalisation of intimacy' that lead to the creation of partnerships play an increasing role in the decision-making process of whether to migrate or not. "Love, whether it is for a partner, lover or friend or for a child, parents of other kin, is so often the key factor in the desire and the decision to

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move to a place where one's feelings, ambitions and expectations [...] can be lived more fully and freely" (MAI and KING 2009: 296). The 'emotional turn' of migration studies can be understood as a mainstream topic affecting all forms of migration in some way.

Another aspect of family migration concerns gender, such as the role of different family members in the process of moving. In traditional families it is often the male partner who initiates the move. Women are often in the position of 'tied migrants', also referred to as 'trailing spouses' or 'trailing wives', neglecting their own career aspirations and submitting to the wishes of the partner (COOKE 2008). Migration can further lead to the disruption of families, especially when migrating over long distances, leaving family members behind in the countries of origins. Family life that takes place across international borders in so-called transnational families is increasing in times of more spatially capricious migration patterns. On the other hand, family reunification plays an important role within the frame of international migration. It describes the process in which family members who had been separated through forced or voluntary migration regroup in a country other than their country of origin (LOM 2004).

#### **3.3.4. *Migrants without migration: the second generation***

Not all persons we are concerned with when talking about migration actually have a migration background themselves. The so-called 'second generation' – a term that is widely used although not very precise in its meaning – describes the descendants of immigrants, meaning people with a migration background but without their own migration history. Second generation only applies to children of migrants, who were born in the country their parents immigrated to. Those who migrate as children together with their parents are called the 'in-between' or '1.5 generation'. Despite the different designations the children of both the second and the 1.5 generations can show the same challenges concerning cultural, linguistic, economic and social integration (SCHNEIDER and CRUL 2012).

The term 'second generation' was originally used for the children of immigrants to the US in the post-war times (see PORTES 1996) and is nowadays also used in Europe, mainly for the children of the former guest workers. The hypothesis is that structural integration today is more difficult than it was in the past due to the development of hybrid identities and globalization (CRUL and VERMEULEN 2003). When looking at young people of the second generation it be-

comes particularly clear that even though they never migrated themselves they are highly influenced by migration. As the integration process can take several generations, at some point youths with a migration background might experience disadvantages on the socio-economic level when compared to young people who were born in their country of residence. In terms of education they might seem to lag behind due to language barriers. Further, the second generation seems to have higher chances of finding employment than immigrants but fewer chances than young people with no migration background, due to a lack of networks, less knowledge of the labour market and experiences of discrimination (CASTLES et al. 2014: 245).

For the topic of youth migration, looking at the second generation or in-between generation is important, although they might not be migrants in the literal sense. Nevertheless, they are young people who are highly influenced by migration. The second generation does show differences especially when the youths transition into education, labour or family formation. Consequently, many statistical offices today also collect data of the 'migration background' and identify the birthplace or the citizenship of the parents as an important demographic, social and economic indicator.



## 4. Youth migration and developmental consequences

The nexus of migration and development has gained scientific attention from various perspectives in the last few years. It is today widely accepted that there is a strong connection between the two topics. Especially since migration is a selective process that is mostly undertaken by young and educated people it is generally recognized as a flow of human capital. But in the last few decades the term ‘development’ has undergone a change of definition. Having originally been considered from a mainly fiscal and economic dimension, today it is also connected to education and factors of well-being (SVR 2016).

The following chapter focuses on themes related to youth migration and emphasizes the impact of youth migration as well as triggering factors that influence the migration of young people (Figure 6). We will explain the consequences that migration has in both the receiving and the sending locations. These consequences not only differ in terms of type of migration, but also in terms of whether it is possible to return to the country of origin, to reintegrate as well as maintain transnational ties, use the media and interact with the diaspora. We will discuss how migration stimulates development and under which circumstances (i.e., as returning or non-returning migrants). Further, the development of the media and the diaspora will be taken into account in order to learn about their importance for young migrants.

Indeed, the greatest discussions in the last few decades of migration research have been related to the question of how micro-level, individual movements and system-level development (local or national) are interconnected. Interestingly, opposing theories from the neoclassical and the historical-structuralist traditions implicitly agree that increasing socio-economic development in sending communities – or decreasing developmental differences between

## 4. Youth migration and developmental consequences


sending and receiving communities – would reduce massive outflows from regions of origin. This argumentation became one of the cornerstones of migration policymaking in regions of destination (as well as of developmental aid and foreign policy, see CLEMENS 2014).

As regards the developmental consequences of migration, however, different theoretical perspectives suggest different scenarios: on the one hand, neoclassical approaches that refer to a market equilibrium based on opposing flows of labour and capital predict positive developmental outcomes of migration in both regions of origin and destination – and a consequent deceleration of emigration from the latter. On the other hand, the advocates of historical structuralism, who emphasize structural imbalance and cumulative causation, state that developmental differences would deepen between sending and receiving regions, which, in turn, would lead to even higher levels of emigration.

Despite discussions, no clear agreement has been reached on the causal relationships between migration and development. Since the millennium, instead of searching for evidence that supports the predictions of one perspective or another, many researchers have turned their attention to the conditions under which migration brings higher development to sending countries and have begun studying migrants and transnational migrant communities as ‘development agents’ responsible for the development of their communities of origin (FAIST 2008; CASTLES 2008).

Figure 6

### Migration decisions and consequences



Source: Our illustration.

## 4.1 Consequences of emigration

KAPUR and McHALE (2005) name 4 general mechanisms of how emigration can affect regional and local development: (1) the loss of capital (taxes) and human capital (knowledge, social and intellectual capital) through the emigration of qualified workers, (2) the positive social, economic and financial effects through networks and connections of the emigrants to the country of origin (diaspora mechanism), (3) return migration and (4) higher investments in individual education in the countries of origin to increase the chance for emigration.

The threat to a country that loses its young and high-skilled citizens is therefore dominant. It is likely that in the long run a country of origin loses its innovative and productive power, which is followed by lower wages for everyone (ELSNER 2015). Aside from the effect of human capital flight and ‘brain drain’ as well as the decreasing number of births in the countries of origin, the general decline of economic growth – coupled with the emerging problems of a shrinking society – can result in further emigration waves through a negative feedback mechanism.

In theory, emigration can also boost the wages of non-emigrants in the sending countries because it leads to labour shortages, and the option to emigrate gives them greater bargaining power. But empirically this is only a short-term effect, and it is usually only typical for highly skilled people (UN 2013). Furthermore, if some regions have more emigrants than others, non-emigrants may move internally to fill the gaps left by emigrants, which, in turn, dampens the increasing wage effect. All in all, emigration does not boost economic development but the causality is difficult to identify: emigration is caused by economic decline and economic decline causes emigration.

### 4.1.1. Remittances

It is well known that the bond between emigrants and their country of origin is not only upheld through active networking and keeping in touch with home, but also through the financial investment in (especially) family members left behind through so-called ‘remittances’. According to the World Bank estimation, remittances have been rising remarkably in the last few years and in most countries are higher and more stable than foreign direct investments and development aid (SvR 2016). Therefore, remittances are seen as an important part of investment in many countries with a major emigration population. There is no consensus

## 4. Youth migration and developmental consequences

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among researchers on the extent of the effects of remittances on the macro-economic level but it definitely has a multiplier effect due to enhanced consumption. The micro-level outcomes are more obvious: it undoubtedly improves the livelihoods of the recipients (health, nutrition, education, improved housing conditions and entrepreneurship activities of recipient households – YANG 2009). Nonetheless, as a stable source of income, remittances may induce a certain level of dependency and negatively impact the labour supply of the recipients, i.e. it may tempt the family members left behind to not seek employment. In extreme cases the collective dependency on remittances can be a mass phenomenon (e.g., in Kosovo at least one-fourth of the households depend on remittances) and pushes the society toward a fragile situation (ELEZAJ et al. 2012).

Remittances are generally influenced by the length of stay in the receiving country but also by the level of qualification. The more time is spent away from home, the less likely it gets to keep up providing remittances. Also, a higher level of qualification has a negative influence on sending remittances back home. In both cases this effect might be caused by the probability of a definite resettlement and also by the sequential migration of family members (Ibid.).

Aside from financial remittances, the import of ideas, attitudes, behaviour and identities can be described as ‘social remittances’ (Ibid.). Demographic, social, cultural or political behaviour can find its way to the countries of origin through networks or be introduced by return migrants. In this way, ‘social remittances’ might possibly lead to a change of societal norms (e.g. according to education, gender issues or environmental protection).

For young migrants, the impact of social remittances might even be higher due to the increasing importance of social networks. Financial remittances, on the other hand, might seem unimportant to many young migrants. Empirical evidence shows that youth migration is often part of an extended period of parental investment into education and that many young migrants continue to receive financial support, especially when they are studying abroad (e.g. university) (HECKERT 2015). Parents of international students often invest a large amount of money over a period of several years in order to give them a good education (Ibid.).

### **4.1.2. Emigration and poverty reduction**


Poverty reduction has long been seen as a means to prevent emigration. If the poorest have an economic perspective, then they will not emigrate – thus, in short, the idea of the root cause approach. However, it has been empirically

proven that the migrant population for the most part does not consist of the poorest population of the country, but that it is rather the young, educated, motivated and adventurous population that migrates. Usually, emigration is only possible when there are resources available, not only financial means but also networks and knowledge. Therefore, the highest number of emigrants come from countries with rapidly emerging market economies.

The relationship between development and the prevalence of migration has been described in the 'migration hump' theory (MARTIN 1993; MARTIN and TAYLOR 1996; DE HAAS 2006), see Figure 7. The empirically visible connection makes an inverted U-curve. With a rising level of economic activity migration also rises at first but after a while, when loans and wealth converge in the countries of destination and origin, migration decreases again.

Figure 7

### The relationship between development and migration



(see DE HAAS 2010)

Although the term 'poverty migration' is often used in common parlance to describe the migration of certain minorities, particularly of Eastern European Romani people, it is not an accurate expression. As BRAHAM and BRAHAM (2000) pointed out, in the course of the EU enlargement in 2004 the main stimulus behind

## 4. Youth migration and developmental consequences

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the mass emigration of Romani from the new member states was the fact that many of them had experienced expulsion, prejudices and ghettoization. Another reason was the high degree of non-identification with their country of previous residence and the strong identification with their own cultural and social group.

### 4.1.3. *Brain drain*

The loss of people through emigration also influences the net human capital of a country. In most of the countries the share of highly qualified people among emigrants is higher than the compared share measured in the total population. This is why outmigration is often understood as the loss of highly skilled people, which is often referred to with the colloquial term 'brain drain' (SVR 2016). The loss of the intellectual elite not only means a loss of financial capital, innovation and productivity, but also a loss of know-how, of experts and of potential political activists and opinions.

As mentioned earlier, KAPUR and McHALE (2005) ranked the loss of human capital (knowledge, social and intellectual capital) as the most important obstacle for development. However, in contrast to this oversimplified brain drain narrative, international labour migration is in fact often more circular. It enables transnational social networks to arise and encourages the transfer of skills and know-how ('brain circulation'), thus creating the opportunity to reduce the negative effects of brain drain. Therefore, migration and developmental policies should aim to converge brain drain with brain circulation and implement specific programmes for return opportunities.

## 4.2. Consequences of immigration

In destination countries, young migrant workers are able to fill job vacancies that local workers are unable or unwilling to take, which can enhance labour market efficiency and contribute to economic growth. Therefore, generally speaking, target countries or regions benefit from immigration. They gain an educated population without paying the educational expenses for schools or universities and they attract young and motivated new citizens, which stimulates the demand side of the economy. However, integration costs and social cohesion in the regions or countries of destination are an important issue, especially when the migrants come from countries with large cultural distances.

#### **4.2.1. Human capital and brain gain**

The inflow of young and skilled workers can result in brain gain (i.e. gaining innovation) as well as, indirectly, economic growth and productivity. Today, the influx and development of knowledge is deeply connected to the theory of human capital. BOURDIEU describes human capital as a mix of financial, social and cultural capital that influences the possibilities, the position and the lifestyle of a person (1986). Human capital has a selective effect on migration and is further seen as the main determinant in the development perspective of a region (BIRG 2005: 96). As such, it is interconnected with brain drain, brain gain and brain circulation.

Still, it is not guaranteed that highly educated labour migrants find a job that matches their profile in the receiving countries. The word 'brain waste' describes the employment of highly skilled migrants in low-skilled jobs, which is often associated with a high wage differential between the target and the sending country (ibid). Brain waste can hinder the potential of brain gain and lead to exploitation. From a theoretical point of view, the segmentation of the labour market also explains why migrants are enrolled in unskilled work to a large extent, despite their actual qualification. Brain waste carries substantial economic costs, it can reduce education incentives, weaken the chances of positive self-selection and decrease the possibility of 'real' brain gain (GARCIA PIRES 2015).

#### **4.2.2. Immigration and social cohesion**

Immigration leads to an increasing diversity in the population of the target countries. As Stuart Hall surmised (1993), the coming question of the 21st century is 'how to fashion the capacity to live with difference', i.e., with the increased mixing of ethnic groups, languages, religions and so forth. Diversity and the issue of immigrants' integration in the expanding cities of the developed European countries has indeed become a hot topic almost everywhere. Consequently, the public sphere, the political arena as well as academic circles show a growing interest in understanding diversity issues and the social outcomes of cultural diversification.

Needless to say, this potential raises questions, many of which centre around the indirect effects on economic development (HABYARIMANA et al. 2007; DAS and DIRIENZO 2014 etc.), the educational and healthcare systems (STODDARD et al. 2000; VEERMAN 2015 etc.) or the risk of tensions (YOUNG 2003; MONTALVO and REYNAL-QUEROL 2007 etc.). However, the topic of the so-called 'community

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cohesion' is perhaps even more intensely contested (KESLER and BLOEMRAAD 2010; HARELL and STOLLE 2015 etc.).

Due to its elusive feature, definitional efforts regarding social cohesion are rare; it is more common to circumscribe the term. The Canadian Federal Policy Research Subcommittee on Social Cohesion provides one of the few explicit definitions: It is the “ongoing process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunity [...], based on a sense of trust, hope and reciprocity” (PRI 1999). In scientific investigations the term is often described and operationalized with the strength of social relations, mutual trust among societal members, solidarity, civic engagement, feelings of a common identity, a sense of belonging to the same community and so forth. As JENSON (1998) summarized: A feeling of belonging, inclusion, participation, recognition and legitimacy are the five widely considered dimensions of social cohesion.

A lot of attention was given, for example, to the publications of LEIGH (2006) and PUTNAM (2007), who claimed that although in the long run immigration and diversity are likely to have important cultural and fiscal benefits, in the short run they tend to reduce social capital through weakening mutual trust and social solidarity. In this process, linguistic distances and host country language skills may play a crucial role and potentially result in problems in meaning exchange and hence in coordination problems (SCHAEFFER 2014). Other researchers, however, reject the opinion and argue that in the European context there is no evidence that cultural diversity in itself undermines social cohesion (e.g. HOOGHE et al. 2009). The research findings about the relationship between diversity and interethnic contacts can be grouped mostly around some well-outlined social theories (collected by GIJSBERTS et al. 2012, among others).

The hypothesis of ‘in-group favouritism’, which is related to the ‘threat theory’, claims that people tend to seek contact with others who are culturally similar to them. Consequently, intergroup interactions in mixed communities are usually less frequent and more superficial. The ‘social control theory’ assumes that if the social norms accepted as common values are missing in the community, mutual distrust can easily prevail. These theories sharply contrast the ‘contact hypothesis’, which emphasizes the positive effects of heterogeneity. Its motive lies in tolerance developed by everyday interactions and mutual understanding, which can result in the strengthening of solidarity and mutual trust. Of course, no one claims that diversification driven by immigration per se could determine any negative or positive consequences but this is definitely a phenomenon worth taking into consideration in migration management.

It is noticeable that while there are significant inconsonant views regarding the relationship between diversity and social cohesion that lead to contrasting published results, the quantity of affirmative and negative papers are more or less in proportion (SCHAEFFER 2014). When it comes to the question of age, a relatively unified position is outlined in the literature. There is growing evidence suggesting that age and experience of direct contact with cultural out-groups have important moderating effects (STURGIS et al. 2014). Growing up in a multicultural society in which ethnic, linguistic, religious minorities play a visible and positive role serves to shift the general attitudes and behaviours of younger cohorts in prosocial directions. Thanks to their stronger adaptation potential younger people are usually less upset by diversity than older generations and “less likely than their forbears to express negative racial attitudes” (FORD 2008; STOLLE and HARELL 2012).

### **4.3 Youth migration and return migration**

The reason why migration has been evaluated negatively for the country of origin for a long time (as described in chapter 4.1.) coincides with the fact that return migration has not been observed or researched for an equally long time. Until the 1960s only little attention was given to the subject of return migration. Migration was seen as a one-directional process, ending with the final decision to emigrate and affecting the sending and receiving countries in doing so. It was in the 1960s that a number of studies appeared which broached the issue of return migration, mainly focusing on migrants returning from the United States, Australia or Canada to Great Britain (see literature gathered by KING 1986). During the onset of the economic recession in the 1970s, further scientific contributions appeared that addressed the issue of returning guest workers (KING et al. 1986). Recent studies have concentrated on the beneficial role of return migrants on economic development (DE HAAS 2005) as well as the effects of integration and transnationalism on the decision of whether to go home or not (DE HAAS and FOKKEMMA 2011).

#### **4.3.1. Return migration – difficult to define**

Aside from the simple distinction between immigration and emigration used in daily parlance, other forms of mobility are also observable in our globalized world. A few examples include transilient migration, when people move from a


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first to a second destination and return home afterwards, re-emigration, when people move back home and emigrate again to the country of destination they had been to before, second-time emigration, when people move to a new destination after having returned for the first time, as well as circular or seasonal migration (Figure 8). To put it simply, return migration means the migration back to the country or region of origin, after a significant period abroad or to another region (KING 1986). This includes the examples mentioned before, which are different types of return migration.

Thus, return migration does not represent a third form of migratory movement next to emigration or immigration; it is always also one of these movements. From the perspective of the push and pull model, return migrants make their decisions based on various factors they consider positive or negative. Additionally, constraints such as the lack of adequate labour appear. Still, the difference is the high personal connection, emotional factors and familiar ties often overrepresented in the motivations to leave or stay. Therefore, countries of origin might be considered to a higher extent, when a second move is undertaken.

Figure 8

Forms of migration and mobility



Source: illustration based on KING 1986 and BOVENKERK 1974

Return migration can further be distinguished in terms of temporality (occasional, periodic, seasonal, permanent) and intentions:

- a) Target migrants are emigrants who intended to return and who migrated with a certain target in mind (education, saving money, etc.). When the target is achieved, they return home in order to use the skills or capital earned abroad.
- b) Not all target migrants return home after their phase abroad, though they may have intended to do so and the idea still exists. Among students who leave home for tertiary education, and later for high-skilled jobs, the 'myth of returning' is often kept alive for a couple of years and sometimes also used as a moral justification to not adapt more to the receiving society.
- c) Permanent emigration may have been intended but a return still happens, either due to factors that bring about a return migration (job loss, family reasons) or other reasons such as unexpected realities, a changing (economic) situation back home or failure (Ibid.).

#### **4.3.2. A typology of return migration**

CERASE (1974) developed a typology of return migrants based on the empirical observations of Italians returning from the US after having emigrated as labour migrants. He defines four types of return: 'return of failure', 'conservatism', 'innovation', and 'retirement' (Table 2).

While 'return of failure' and 'return of conservatism' mainly occur in returnees who have spent only a short time in the target country and have never entirely integrated in the receiving society, there are also forms that end in a return after the migrants have settled and integrated into the society of destination as well as after a longer stay: the 'return of innovation' and the 'return of retirement'. While CERASE explains that all migrants have difficulties to overcome in the first months or years of immigration, due to the lack of language knowledge, human contact and prejudices, he differentiates between people who successfully adapt to the new situation and those who do not. He describes the 'return of failure' as occurring when the person has failed to successfully integrate into the new society and has strong enough ties to easily go back to the country of origin. CERASE sees an interconnection between rural emigration to industrial and urban contexts and a return of failure. Many of the returnees do not succeed at adapting to the region of arrival because of the great differences they experience.

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Table 2

### Types of return migration

	Time spent in destination society	Reason for return	Consequences of return
<b>Return of failure</b>	Less than 5 years	Unable to solve challenges of the first impact with new society	No change of investment or status
<b>Return of conservatism</b>	5 to 10 years	Strong ties to country of origin; economic gain as main achievement	Investment (e.g. housing, private business); no adaptation of skills; no change in status
<b>Return of Innovation</b>	More than 10 years	Wish to achieve improvement in the country of origin	Investment and change of status; difficulties of reintegration
<b>Return of Retirement</b>	More than 20 years	Missing ties in the country of destination; work-orientated lifestyle; nostalgia	Investments (e.g. housing)
<b>No return</b>		Lacking opportunities in country of origin; new bonds and ties in receiving society	Remittances, diaspora involvement

Source: CERASE 1974, KING 1986.

Remigrants within the category of the ‘return of conservatism’ succeeded in overcoming the first difficulties, but after some years of economic gain and saving money they still return. The intention behind their migration was to obtain the instruments with which to enjoy a better life in their country of origin.

The ‘return of innovation’ seems to be the best-case scenario, and it is no wonder that this topic is garnering increased attention in contemporary migration projects. As a source of innovative enterprise development it holds enormous potential not only for the return regions, but also for the returnees themselves, who more and more frequently decide to run transnational businesses. Although the transnational entrepreneurs are relatively new actors of the economies of the post-socialist European countries (on the Serbian and Albanian case study see, e.g., PREDOJEVIC-DESPIC et al. 2016), their role could

be crucial because they connect the countries of origin and destination in the transnational space. Their simultaneous involvement in two or more social environments allows them to maintain key global relations and maximize material and non-material profit (TERJESEN and ELAM 2009; DRIORI et al. 2010). As a consequence, the returnees want to make a considerable change in their social status when returning home and also improve their own and the situation of others in their sending destination. Although the return of innovation indicates a further improvement of the society of origin, those ideas often encounter opposition from traditional ways of thinking.

'Return of retirement' is typical for those who still have stronger ties to their original home destination, maybe invested in a house there and wish to mark their end of labour, a life dominated by work, with a change of residency. Often feelings of nostalgia for the old times play a major role in retirement migration. Although they have reached the end of their working life, pensioners (receiving a pension from the destination country) can initiate financial investments.

Different types of returning migrants can be linked to different potential effects in the country they move back to, therefore CERASE's categories have a key importance in practice. The post-return impact depends largely on the stage of the process of acculturation that the migrants had reached at the moment of return, but also on the duration of absence, the social class and the differences between countries or regions of origin and destination. Return migrants have not always adopted skills during their absence which they could also use in the country of origin. Also, the capital that they bring home is not always used in a way to raise productivity and economy. Most commonly returnees invest in housing, sometimes also in small business development, e.g. in the tourism sector. Thus, in most cases return migration only has a small or indirect macro-economic impact on the return destination.

Not only the original emigration generation can be considered to return, but also the second generation or the 1.5 generation might see reasons for returning, if strong ties to the country of origin are maintained (e.g. through regular visits or transnational identities) (KING 2011). Reasons for a return of the second generation can be described as follows: family reasons (taking care of parents or grandparents), cultural reasons (rediscovering one's roots), social idealism (helping the homeland develop) and entrepreneurs exploring or seeking business solutions (McPHERSON and MCPHERSON 2009). The return of the second generation often brings about unanticipated challenges and disillusionment for the returnees (CONWAY and POTTER 2009).

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### 4.3.3. *Reasons for not returning*

In many cases a person's high involvement in the destination society is a reason for them not to return to their place of origin, and not only in economic terms, but also due to partnership and family formation, especially for young migrants. For high-skilled migrants with a tertiary education it is sometimes impossible to return to the region or country of origin due to the mismatch of labour demand and supply in relation to their specialized knowledge. Studying the motivations behind the leaving and returning of young Portuguese researchers, DELICADO (2010) found out that the main reasons for returning are family reasons (wanting to be closer to spouses, parents or friends) and the wish to contribute to the development of the scientific system of Portugal. Reasons for not returning were the lack of job opportunities as well as the state of the scientific system in Portugal and low salaries. The return of innovation is therefore not possible due to lacking opportunities on the labour market. Based on a recent survey, DESPIC (2015) drew similar conclusions about the unlikelihood of a mass return of high-skilled Serbians from Canada and the USA, who left the country around 1991. Nevertheless, their constant need for being well-informed about the economic and political situation in Serbia and their strong ties with the compatriots abroad as well as with their family members, friends and colleagues in Serbia are without doubt good preconditions for establishing an effective diaspora policy. Thus, even without returning, diaspora populations may have a positive influence on the country of origin (see Chapter 4.4.).

## 4.4. Transnational mobility

### 4.4.1. *A conceptual approach*

More and more often, migratory movements are not permanent (FASSMANN 2002). Dual or multiple identities, circular migration patterns, unsteady commuting across international boundaries and living between two societies or households has become more prevalent. This fluid form of migrating between two places and never really leaving one or arriving at the other has gained attention under the name of 'transnationalism' – a new form of mobility. Transnational mobility has become more prevalent due to a higher permeability of national borders, permanent economic inequalities and technological advances in transport and communication (cheap flights, buses and trains, new road connections, internet and satellite TV, see also chapter 4.5.). Distances can be

overcome in a shorter amount of time, and networks can be established and perpetuated over longer distances.

Transnationality presents challenges for integrating into the new society, but also for returning to the old society. The possibility of never really leaving and never really returning eventually leads to a new form of living between two societies. Table 3 offers an overview of differences between traditional emigration and immigration and transnational movements, as well as their implications. Transnational mobility can lead to a permanent splitting of households, the development of hybrid identities (when the mixing and overlapping of different cultural norms and values becomes an integral part of one’s self-image), a high interaction with the countries of origin and the maintenance of two households over a longer period of time. These two categories are vague rather than strict but the Danube region in particular offers political and economic conditions that create an increasing occurrence of transnational mobility (Ibid.).

Table 3

**Structural requirements and consequences of transnational mobility**

	<b>Structural requirements</b>	<b>Consequences and implications</b>
<b><i>Traditional emigration and immigration</i></b>	Strict boundaries and economic inequalities High investments in overcoming distances (time, costs, efforts) Migration without network ties Devaluation of skills (brain waste)	Family migration Permanent migration (giving up the former place of residency completely) Minor interaction with the society of origin Incorporation into the society of destination (assimilation)
<b><i>Transnational mobility</i></b>	Porous boundaries and economic inequalities Shrinking differences and improvement of accessibility Network ties Transferability of qualifications and skills	Split households (permanently) Temporary migration with keeping up (at least) two alternative places of residency High interaction with the country of origin (travels, remittances, communication) Hybrid identities (“living in two societies”), no assimilation, no marginalization

Source: FASSMAN 2002.

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### 4.4.2. *Diaspora as a trigger for transnational mobility*

The term 'diaspora' was originally used to denote religious or national groups living outside of an (imagined) homeland (FAIST 2010). For a long time it was only used to describe the dispersion of the Jewish population throughout the world, and it is only in the past 30 years that it has gained more attention from the academic world and the media (BRUNEAU 2010). It has since been extended to other religious minorities such as the Armenians in Europe, and from the late 1970s onward diaspora has been used even more variously and can today be applied as a term for non-resident citizens.

While an older understanding of diaspora implied that its members do not integrate into the new country of settlement and maintain a demarcation between the majority group(s), the contemporary understanding emphasizes a cultural hybridity of its members. Still, diaspora implies some cultural distinctiveness of the diaspora vis-à-vis other groups (FAIST 2010). Therefore, a diaspora group is statistically not that easy to define, since a sentiment of community feeling and sense of solidarity are set preconditions. From a wider perspective, today citizenship is regarded as recognizing diaspora communities in different countries. The boundaries and overlaps between the concepts of transnationalism and diaspora are fuzzy. The concept of diaspora refers to a community or group that is engaged in activities (such as poverty alleviation, development projects) in their sending states or tries to preserve cultural traditions (festivities, languages). Transnationalism can be seen as the prerequisite for diaspora development on a wider scale and refers to processes that transcend international borders and establishes cross-border social spaces (Ibid.).

Examples for diaspora policies are presented in chapter 5 as a perspective for countries and cities of emigration. Expatriate communities play an important role in supporting the sending location but also as a network for receiving migrants and for stimulating migration. However, while diasporas are indeed able to connect sending and receiving territories in the transnational space, which holds great potential for bridging geographic, social and cultural distances, in certain situations they can be mobilized as a tool for ethnic lobbying or promoting particular political efforts of their home countries, e.g. secession movements. Whether the overall trend of diaspora mobilization shifts towards moderation or radicalism (in other words: whether they are 'peace makers' or 'peace wreckers' in such situations) not only depends on the current phase of the conflict spiral at home, but also on the interest of the homeland-based political elite and their linkages to the diaspora (KOINOVA 2013). As the development

of diaspora communities is largely connected to the modern technology boom in general, social networking websites provide an especially fertile ground for the communities to engage in political activism.

#### **4.4.3. *The media and IT: requirements for bridging distances***

The term 'transnationalism' has often been paired in the literature with phenomena such as the "annihilation of space" or the "death of distance" (CAIRNCROSS 1997). "Communication has become cheaper, more frequent and more media rich" (DEKKER and ENGBERSEN 2013). While VERTOVEC referred to cheap telephone calls as the "social glue of migrant transnationalism" (2004), the rise of new technologies has deepened the belief that communication technologies profoundly influence the social lives of migrants. Indeed, several studies show that internet-based communication plays a major role in maintaining relationships between the home and host society (e.g. KOMITO 2011). Furthermore, the manifold options for following updates via video chat, email, instant messaging, texting and social media channels make it possible to manage close relationships over long distances. In a study on Polish migrants in Ireland the majority of the respondents mentioned that from six significant contacts in their life only half of them actually lived in the same country (ibid.). New technology and media offers migrants the opportunity to be less connected with their actual place of living and still enjoy close social connections (Ibid.).

On the other hand, media also makes the migration process easier by reducing the boundaries of contacting other migrants to exchange information, resources and assistance. The internet (e.g. via social media platforms) makes it easy to revive or find new contacts and offers an extensive pool of informal information (DEKKER and ENGBERSEN 2013). Internet usage and television consumption across international borders furthermore motivates migration movements by making it possible to get to know the world outside and seek economic opportunities in other parts of the world (MAI 2001).



## **5. From control to migration management – policies and strategies governing youth migration**

### **5.1 The paradigmatic shift**

#### ***5.1.1. A retrospection***

Emigration and immigration have always been linked to political topics. In earlier times, the loss of population due to emigration was considered equal to the loss of economic and political or even military power. Therefore, emigration used to be discouraged, and it was only with the French revolution that the human right to emigrate was proclaimed, which led to massive migration movements within Europe between 1820 and 1920 (CASTLES et al. 2014: 297). Still, up until today, emigrants are usually not viewed positively by countries (or regions) of origin, which is why emigration is considered a temporary status and the expectation is that migrants will return home after a period away (ibid.). The notion of emigration being directly linked to fewer chances of development due to brain drain has only been blurred in the past few years, when remittances and diaspora policies became recognized as important aspects of development and emigration was regarded as a relief for unemployment. Maintaining ties to the countries of origin through dual citizenship, the right to vote or the support of the rights and welfare of the population in the destination countries have become more prevalent strategies.

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The control of migration does not only imply the control of emigration, but also the legal framework in the receiving countries. The recognition of the demand for a labour force marks an important shift of the perception of immigration in the early twenty-first century (CASTLES et al. 2014: 241). Until the 1970s the active recruitment of a legal foreign labour force or the tacit permission of irregular employment was able to satisfy the needs of many industrial countries simultaneously experiencing shortages of the working population and a growing economy. During the financial crisis of the 1970s not only did the quest for control increase regarding the admission of temporary foreign workers and employer sanctions when irregular migration occurred, but the demand for the legalization of illegal workers and integrational measures also occurred. Since then stricter measures have been introduced in most immigration countries, and high-skilled labour can access the foreign labour market much more easily. Nevertheless, due to demographic factors immigration is nowadays seen as a chance. Low fertility rates in most European countries creates a demand for receiving and integrating immigrants. (Ibid.)

From the perspective of the United Nations (UNFPA 2004), which was adopted by the European Union, it is necessary to try not to change human behaviour and make people stay where they are, but rather to manage migration by using international cooperation that takes into account the interests and objectives of all parties involved: the migrants, the countries of origin and the sending countries. Therefore, the agenda of 'High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development' convened by the UN since 2013 also advocates human rights, considering the developmental impact of migration and mobility, trying to combat irregular migration and human trafficking, improving public perceptions of migrants and enhancing migration partnerships and cooperations. In some cases, the outcomes of migration can be perceived as challenges, in others as chances – depending on the evaluation of different actors and individuals. Sometimes the challenges and potentials stem directly from emigration or immigration (see the topic of depopulation), and sometimes there is only an indirect link (e.g. a lack of health care support called 'care drain' as the lack of work force for social care is missing). While the potentials and challenges are in most cases exclusively related to immigration or emigration, it has to be mentioned that both phenomena can still happen at the same time in certain regions.

So far there is no uniform opinion on how migration and development affect each other but it is widely recognized that there is no unidirectional impact and that the developmental consequences of emigration are context-specific.

In times when migration was considered a one-way street from country of origin to country of destination, brain drain was generally seen as the main outcome of emigration. Today, migration has widely gained the connotation of being a possible potential for countries of origin (CLEMENS 2014). Global migration streams have changed and become multi-directional: return migration, circular forms of migration and the development of an active diaspora as well as the rising flows of remittances have led to the idea that migration might also be considered a form of bottom-up development strategy leading to brain gain (SVR 2016).

### ***5.1.2. The policy challenges and potentials of emigration and immigration***

On a national and local level, migration presents a cross-cutting topic because of its multiple consequences. Taking into account either countries of origin or countries of destination, almost all major policy fields are in some way affected by migration. The following table lists the relevant policy fields affected by emigration or immigration in general and reviews some of the potential effects (Table 4).

Immigration and emigration directly influence the demographic structure and size of a population or society. Challenges and chances emerge when people leave and new people join a society. Depopulation and ageing are the direct consequences of emigration. In most European countries, a negative natural population development can be observed, which means that a negative migration balance leads to even more pronounced consequences. Since migration is highly selective, it is also connected with the loss of elites. Additionally, families often do not move as a whole, meaning that some people are left behind and lose their social and potentially also financial background.

While from a demographic perspective emigration does not per se offer any potential unless people return, the idea of social remittances still needs to be considered. Societies with a large diaspora population are able to gain social innovation through people leaving. While immigration can be seen as a major gain from a demographic perspective (when population growth or a stable population is aimed at) to compensate fertility declines, for a society this can also be a challenge. An increase in population puts pressure on the welfare state due to a higher demand of services and infrastructures. Different cultural backgrounds coming together makes it necessary to create common values. However, a diverse population can be seen as a potential as can the increase of solidarity and social inclusion.

## 5. From control to migration management

Table 4

### Immigration/Emigration – challenges and potentials for policy fields

	Immigration		Emigration	
	Challenges	Potentials	Challenges	Potentials
<i>Society and demography</i>	Different values; weakening social cohesion; increasing demand for welfare state services	Diversity; solidarity and inclusion; population stability/growth; compensation of fertility decline	Depopulation; ageing; loss of political elites and perspectives; lost taxes; demographic challenges; families left behind (children, grandparents); transnational families	Return of social remittances; gain of social innovation; alleviation of high population growth
<i>Labour market and economy</i>	Oversupply of work force (esp. in certain sectors); brain waste; discrimination of foreign work force; wage dumping; increase of informal employment	Covering under-supply of work force; innovation through human capital gain	Lack of work force and taxes; lost innovation	Relief for unemployment; skill improvement of potential returnees; transfer of know-how; remittances; cooperation (joint-ventures); investments; wage increases
<i>Education and research</i>	Integrational measures (language)	Exchange; innovation; brain gain and brain circulation	Graduates leaving (brain drain)	Exchange; innovation; brain circulation through returning migrants
<i>Infrastructure, planning and regional development</i>	Need for new infrastructure and services (potentially with diverse demands); challenges of urbanization	New innovators; economic growth and investment	Keeping up services of general interests in depopulation areas	Concentration at growth poles
<i>Health and care</i>	Demand for multilingual services	Potential work force for the health care sector;	Lack of work force for the social sector (care drain); loss of potential caregivers;	Return of health care professionals

Source: our illustration.

From an economic perspective, the loss of labour force is mostly perceived as a threat and its gain as a potential to cover undersupply. Still, migration can also be seen as a way to counterbalance labour market insufficiencies from the perspective of the emigration countries. Therefore, potentials can be found in both directions. As we already discussed in chapter 4.1.4. and further elaborated on in chapter 5.2., emigration can nowadays be perceived as a chance to relieve labour markets by offering work and income somewhere, and this can lead to poverty reduction (e.g. by target earning or remittances). Other potentials for emigration countries are the improvement of skills and the transfer of knowledge and investments.

In the case of education and research, migration nowadays is mostly seen as a potential. Although the threat of brain drain is high in emigration countries, the idea of brain circulation has led to more attention paid to the advantages of migration (see chapter 4.1.3.). Still, active networks or returning migrants are necessary in order to profit from innovations and knowledge transfers. In the primary and secondary education sectors, immigration can become a challenge when it comes to language barriers.

For planning and infrastructure, population growth and shrinkage represent a challenge. International immigration can lead to an increase in diversified needs and demands, and in emigration locations keeping up service provision is a big challenge. While growth can be considered a potential for immigration locations, shrinkage might enable the emigration locations to concentrate their resources on lively areas and growth poles.

Health care is a very crucial service and its adequate availability in areas of emigration is often under threat. Not only from an institutional point of view, but also from a family perspective emigration can cause a lack in potential caregivers. Here again, the return of skilled migrants (e.g. medical doctors) can be seen as a prospect. For immigration locations immigration often represents a way to gain potential workers in the health care sector.

## **5.2. From a win-lose to a triple-win situation**

The previous chapter illustrated that challenges and potentials are not simply one-directional. Migration does not solely create challenges in emigration countries and potentials in immigration countries. Challenges and potentials can be encountered in both places. Further, impacts on the individual migrants

## 5. From control to migration management

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themselves also need to be emphasized (UN 2013): for the individual, migration offers the potential to provide work opportunities that are not available in their place of origin, as well as educational opportunities, income opportunities or other forms of advantages. This also holds true for return and non-return youth migration. Additionally, migration can have indirect effects on individual youths like empowerment and self-realization. From a negative point of view young migrants are exposed to discrimination, exploitation and abuse. Remittances sent by individuals could lead to a more risky behaviour of the receivers in the countries of origin.

Sending countries generally experience loss and receiving countries oftentimes profit, e.g. from gaining labour force. In order to have a favourable situation for both the emigration and immigration location as well as for the individuals affected by migration, the idea of a “triple-win situation” is currently being discussed in migration and development studies: a win for the country of origin, a win for the receiving country and a win for the individual migrant. In fact, diaspora policies and other forms of regulation (for sending remittances or embedding labour recruitment programmes) created by governments worldwide are pointing in this direction. Especially for young migrants, who have the potential to migrate multiple times in their lives, aspiring towards a win-win situation is desirable.

Partnerships and international cooperation are essential for managing today's international migration trends. Effectively balancing measures addressing various migration-related issues without creating improvement in one area to the detriment of another is a key challenge. Identifying essential parts of a national migration policy is one important step in the development of a strategy for managing migratory flows both at the national and international level (IOM 2003).

To create this triple-win situation for receiving and sending states and combine migration and development has been the goal of so-called ‘mobility partnerships’. One of the most well-known examples, referred to by MASSEY in 1997, is the temporary programme of labour for Mexicans and Canadians proposed for the US labour market. The main pillar of this programme was the idea of binational agencies, e.g. for insurances and regional development. Also, the foundation of a bank operating binationally was proposed to improve the option of saving money (SVR 2016: 172). In Germany, the national labour agency and the national development agency (GIZ) have initiated pilot projects for educating and procuring a labour force in the health care sector. Binational

programmes with Serbia, among other countries, have been implemented for procuring nursing staff. In Vietnam Germany is taking over the costs of education of staff (ibid).

In recent years many countries of destination have adopted migration policies as part of their national strategies and development plans which are implemented through laws, regulations and programme measures with the objective to manage immigration. Although the policies on immigration usually respond to practical aspects (e.g. labour market needs, demographic objectives of destination countries), sometimes its direction is influenced by populist political ideologies and irrational negative emotions (xenophobia, islamophobia etc.).

The positive effects of immigration on destination societies (gaining innovation, enhancing labour market efficiency, economic growth etc.) were emphasized several times in the conceptual framework, and this potential for local municipalities cannot be overestimated. In the postmodern economy competitiveness and wealth are more and more determined by the new creative class which is drawn to a particular quality of place: open communities where difference is welcome and cultural creativity is easily accessed. Thus immigration, diversity and tolerance can be considered the pillars of creative competitiveness (FLORIDA 2002). However, these mechanisms do not play out in a socio-cultural vacuum, and there are no 'guarantees that interactions will be peaceful, productive, or characterized by mutual respect' (LANDAU 2008). In order to use the potential of immigration and minimize the possibility of negative effects, fostering the integration of immigrants (or more precisely their incorporation, which is a more neutral term) and strengthening community cohesion seems to be of key importance for diversifying local municipalities. Therefore, the notion of 'integration policy' can be encapsulated by the wider term of 'diversity management', or even 'super-diversity management'.

While post-war global migration was comprised mainly of 'large numbers moving from one particular place to other particular places' (e.g. Algeria-France, Turkey-Germany), since the 1980s we have witnessed more people in 'small numbers moving from many places to many places' (VERTOVEC 2010). The increasing complexity of international migration in terms of origin and destination areas, migration channels and the social characteristics of the migrants themselves has obviously led to further diversification in the expanding cities of the West. Since new immigrants typically inhabit urban spaces 'which still play host to migrants from previous waves', the new complexities 'are layered on top of

## 5. From control to migration management

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the pre-existing patterns of diversity'. The emergence of these conditions has been called 'super-diversity' (VERTOVEC 2007).

Emigration can also generate challenges and opportunities for *countries of origin*. While some less developed countries view emigration as a strategy for boosting development through the alleviation of labour market pressures, in other countries concerns are raised about the loss of human resources, which may hinder development. Although policies to lower emigration are still common among these countries, a growing number of governments have recognized that their diaspora can contribute to the development of their home countries through remittances, financial investments as well as through the transfer of knowledge and skills.

Today more than half of the UN member states have their own diaspora or emigrants department (COLLYER 2013), yet 'diaspora policies' have very diverging priorities. In order to attract diaspora investment, six specific measures can be identified worldwide: (1) tax exemptions or breaks, (2) reduction of tariffs on goods or import duties for diaspora companies, (3) preferential treatment for providing credit, (4) preferential treatment for the allotment of licences, (5) streamlined bureaucratic procedures for investment and (6) diaspora bonds or mutual funds (UNDESA 2013: 75). Such policies offer a range of possibilities for Central and Eastern European governments with the purpose of exploiting their economic, professional potential and their ability to improve the image of the kin state abroad, integrating the diaspora individual into the diaspora community, enhancing the connection to the homeland, strengthening and reproducing their national identity and reaching the members of the newest diaspora (HERNER-KOVÁCS 2017). So far, it seems, countries in the Danube region have concentrated in their outreach to emigrants on identity politics, while neglecting social and economic issues.

However, it should be noted that the promotion of return migration that runs parallel with an active diaspora policy can be controversial in theory, and in practice the weight distribution depends on the current interest of the sending country, such as the amount of remittances. It is thus no wonder that the nations with a significant diaspora pay crucial attention to the valorisation of their diaspora's potential role for development (by persuading them to send remittances back home or to support the homeland's economy through investments).

Aside from strengthening diaspora policies, governments continue to support programmes related to return migration as well (UNDESA 2013: 72). We can distinguish between three types of such policies (JONKERS 2008): (1) migrant

network policies (stimulating contacts between the home system and diaspora communities of scientists and businessmen); (2) temporary return programmes (e.g. for scientists who teach or do research for a limited period of time in their home country); (3) permanent return programmes (encouraging the permanent return of highly skilled migrants to their home country by providing tax cuts, attractive research facilities or bonus payments). The long-term priorities of programmes which facilitate return migration usually are: housing support policies, especially for families with children, developing child care provisions, raising the standards of employer-employee relations, changing the tax and social benefit systems to support families, lessening bureaucratic obstacles for launching and running businesses etc. (GALGÓCZI et al. 2016).

Since citizens benefit from equal rights within the EU and since accession states and neighbouring states are often also enrolled in partnership programmes, binational policies concerning diaspora politics have not been implemented. Still, the models also offer some ideas for the European context, especially in terms of support, networking and education. Further cooperation with sectoral policies, labour market offices or education and job training institutions, to name a few, could be enhanced and lead to a triple-win situation.

### **5.3. Towards a migration policy for youths**

Policies tackling challenges related to migration as well as policies for youths can be understood as a cross-sectional structure of policy fields ‘layered on top of each other’. Thus, an explicit migration policy for youths would definitely require a holistic perspective. These strategies have to be integrated into several policy fields (which were presented in chapter 5.2.) in order to ensure that the potential of youth migration is fully harnessed. It can offer opportunities, improvement of the socio-economic status as well as human and financial capital for young people. Therefore a migration policy for youths must seek to increase advantages for young migrants and protect them from risks and exploitation.

In order to converge the different policy fields toward a discrete youth migration policy there is a definite need to strengthen the evidence base, which means improving our knowledge and information about young migrants. Apart from stock data about the quantity and characteristics of youth migration, relevant information on their health, education and social protection would be necessary in order to design and implement effective policies for young migrants (GMG 2014).

## 5. From control to migration management

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Although many policies will need to be implemented on a national level, it still has to be emphasized that also local and regional levels play an important role when it comes to the development of strategies for youth migration. Since local authorities play a main role to ensure youths' access to employment, housing, schools and health care (thus their remarkable influence on people's decisions to stay or leave), involving them in youth migration governance seems to be of key importance (GMG 2014).

While in the countries and regions of immigration national policies provide the general framework for integration and inclusion, in fact the societies of the villages, towns and cities are the ones to promote, support and advance inclusion and participation. Integration is essentially a local process (NIESSEN and ENGBERINK 2006), thus focusing on smaller scales such as neighbourhoods is crucial in order to reach the goal of integration.

For countries of origin national and global aspects (structural factors) very often play a prominent role in emigration. However, the ideas presented above concerning networks, diaspora relationships and return options also show the significance of the local level (attracting investments, establishing possibilities to reintegrate etc.). Furthermore, return networks and ideas are connected with emotional bindings, families and kin, and here, again, the local level is crucial.

Different forms of political organization can be found within the countries of the Danube region. Therefore, the role and power of the local municipalities and their potential for implementing local strategies and policies also varies. One example is the organization of the welfare state and the provision of services of general interest. While in Austria and Germany social welfare is mainly organized through public funding and also has a great influence on the local and regional level, other countries show a higher importance of private influence (e.g. Slovenia) or in terms of organization on the national level (e.g. Bulgaria, Hungary) (RAUHUT et al. 2013). Still, the role of the local level should not be underestimated. Sometimes small interventions like improving the quality of life can be enough to influence the decision to stay or return. In the appendix, a couple of projects implemented on the local and regional levels are presented, some of which are examples of how to try and tackle the challenges of migration (YURA, Re-Turn etc.).

## 6. Outlook

The scope of the theoretical overview was to establish a proper framework and a guideline for the YOUMIG project activities. The conceptual framework aimed at evaluating and operationalizing the challenges and potentials of managing migration of the 15-34 age group in general and in the Danube region in particular.

After the definition and clarification of the most important terms the conceptual framework put youth migration into a wider context. We pointed out that although every individual life follows its own individual course, changes of residence within the age group of 15-34 are usually related to specific life course transitions:

- the transition to higher education,
- from education to work,
- from unemployment to employment
- and from living with the parents to living independently or starting one's own family.

Although younger generations have different migratory patterns than older generations regarding their aspirations to explore the world, realize their goals, study or work abroad, start a family etc. (while experiencing lower migration costs and higher migration gains), it can nevertheless be considered a specific type of migration and not a theoretical exception.

And indeed the topic is worth paying attention to, not least due to the fact that the majority of migrants are young people. In Austria, for example, 55% of the incoming migrants were aged between 15 and 34 in 2015. On the other hand, as with other forms of migration youth migration is triggered by macro- (economic or political circumstances), micro- (individual factors) and me-

## 6. Outlook

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so-level factors (personal networks). Since the YOUMIG project focuses on youth migration and its consequences on municipalities, the paper proposed a revised version of the push and pull model as the core concept that offers both micro- and a macro-level insight.

The conceptual framework underlines that the outcome of migration on the local level in sending and receiving countries not only depends on the type of migrant, but also on the option to return to the country of origin, to keep up transnational ties, to interact with the diaspora, to use media and even on the attitude of the receiving society toward cultural diversification driven by immigration. The paper sheds light on the background of the ongoing debate on the migration development nexus. However, as we also emphasized, today, policy measures (e.g. diaspora or remittances policies, programmes for labour recruitment) are pointing in the direction of a triple-win situation.

In this line of thought, the key message of the conceptual framework is that with the right policies in place youth migration can be transformed from a challenge into an opportunity, and the win-loss situation can be turned into a triple-win, benefitting the migrants, the countries of origin and the countries of destination. To achieve these goals a paradigmatic shift of the perception of migration is very much required, which would push the whole topic into a more positive direction.

Young generations can be considered the key to improving labour market development and demographic trends but their potential is often neglected. If no changes are made, the Danube region might lose competitiveness due to unmanaged territorial distribution of human capital. Although impacts of youth migration accumulate on national levels and result in calls for appropriate action by national level administrations, local governments could and should also play a pivotal role in managing youth migration and in supporting the youths in coping with these challenges. However, they currently lack the capacities and tools for this kind of action. In order to give a proper response to these challenges, local governments need a more precise evidence base and better data and policy tools. The project's intervention properly addresses the territorial needs and challenges by enabling a better understanding of the subtle processes and transnational impacts, and by generating new or improved tools for measuring and tracing the effects of youth migration.

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## Appendix

### Projects tackling the challenges of youth migration

Since the issue of migration has been in the limelight of public, political and scientific awareness for decades, a number of international projects were launched worldwide to tackle the challenges arising from migration, particularly in the last twenty years. However, relatively few of them brought into focus the age factor and dealt specifically with the reasons, motors and consequences of youth migration. Without being exhaustive, in the following section we are going to give a short overview of some relevant European projects in order to offer insight into the key policy areas affected by migration.

First, we want to refer to the ‘SEEMIG’ project. YOUNIG can be considered the follow-up project of SEEMIG and its consortium is composed similarly. SEEMIG’s partnership included research institutes, statistical offices and local governments from eight countries (Austria, Italy, Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Serbia and Bulgaria) and observers from three countries (Albania, Georgia and Ukraine). The main goal of SEEMIG was to better understand long-term South-East European migratory and demographic processes, their effects on labour markets, national and regional economies and, based on enhanced empirical evidence, on empowering public administrations. Several types of scientific output – a new, coherent, transnational data base, pilot surveys, population projections, historical country profiles – aimed to help local, regional and national authorities and other stakeholders to conceptualize and implement strategies concerning migration management.

Some of the presented projects deal explicitly with the situation of the countries of origin. The YURA project (Your Region Your Future), for example, aimed

at fostering cooperation between regional players from the political, economic and educational sectors in order to counteract the emigration of young people from the rural areas of Central Europe (from the Danube countries: Austria and Hungary). The main purpose of the pilot actions was to let pupils get acquainted with local career perspectives and to establish new and direct cooperations between schools and regional companies in order to retain well-educated young talents. Altogether 18 pilot projects were carried out which involved more than 3500 youngsters, and 39 new cooperations were established during the project's lifespan.

Regarding the outmigration of young adults' as both a cause and an indicator for economic and social fragility, the SEMIGRA project (Selective Migration and Unbalanced Sex Ratio in Rural Regions), which was conducted within the framework of the ESPON 2013 Programme, sought to identify the main reasons and consequences of the phenomenon with special attention to young and highly educated women leaving peripheral rural regions in Hungary, Germany, Finland and Sweden. According to the policy recommendations of the project, the overall objective of the strategies was to develop a 'new rurality', diversify the regional economy, support a flexible and family-friendly labour market (e.g. through assisting female business start-ups) and all strategies that are suitable for improving the image and self-confidence of the region as a whole.

Many of the projects are expected to produce a new knowledge base for policy makers working on integration policies in countries of destination. The TIES project, for instance, focused on the integration of the second generation in eight European countries, including Austria, and Germany. The main objective of the international survey was to create a systematic and rigorous dataset of more than 10,000 young descendants of immigrants from Turkey, former Yugoslavia and Morocco that was relevant for the development of policies at all levels of government. The results showed that context does matter in integration, particularly in public domains such as inter-ethnic relationships or feelings of national belonging. In fact, institutional arrangements in the receiving society make it possible for an immigrant group to find a productive place and position.

The transnational project AMICALL (Attitudes to Migrants, Communication and Local Leadership) aimed at providing a platform for the development of new strategies for the local and regional authorities' communication activities. It sought to identify which factors can provide the necessary conditions under which the local and regional authorities' communication activities have positive effects on people's attitudes towards migrants and their integration, and how these positive effects can be achieved. To reach the goal, a number of case

studies were elaborated, which were researched through documentary analyses and stakeholder interviews. The project concluded that although public attitudes toward migration vary significantly across Europe, there are particular commonalities in each of the analysed countries, e.g. in Germany and Hungary. In general, local and regional authorities need long-term strategic development instead of ad hoc responses to critical incidents. However, the lack of an evaluation of their efforts' real impacts can be considered a common problem. The success or failure of their activities – e.g. communication campaigns, hands-on projects – depend quite often on factors like fiscal austerity, lack of political will, personalities and individual commitment or regulatory frameworks.

EDUMIGROM (Ethnic Differences in Education and Diverging Prospects for Urban Youth in an Enlarged Europe) is a transnational project, funded by the 7th Framework Programme of the European Commission, aimed to conduct a comparative investigation in multi-ethnic communities with second-generation migrants and Romani people in nine EU countries. The project explored how far existing educational practices and policies in different welfare regimes protect youths with a migration background against marginalization and social exclusion. The multi-stakeholder project iYouth aims to support migrant youth organizations in Austria, Finland, France, Poland and the Czech Republic to work better towards integration and preventing the exclusion of young migrants.

As the conceptual framework has already emphasized, return migration holds significant potential for countries of origin through compensating the loss of human capital in earlier periods. It is no wonder that this topic is garnering more and more attention and has been appearing more frequently in recent migration projects. Since 2014, Generation E – a cross-border data journalism project – has collected more than 2,000 stories of young emigrants from Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece in order to identify their motivations, destinations and their willingness to return. Although the geographic focal point clearly differs from that of the YOUMIG project (apart from Germany, which is among the three most popular destination countries in each case), some of their results can be generalized to some extent. While the significance of driving factors varies from country to country, the 'work-related issues' seem to be the number one reason everywhere, followed by the categories, 'personal ambitions' and 'education' in second and third place. However, and this can be encouraging for the South European countries, the great majority of their young emigrants would like to return; 12% of them in 5 years, 13% in about 10 years and 46% 'hope' to go back in the future.

Although a number of surveys show their willingness to return, these people very often face problems in the reintegration process. Therefore, the cross-national project entitled Re-Turn (Regions Benefitting from Returning Migrants) explicitly pushes this topic onto the political agenda of Central European countries, including Germany, Austria, Hungary and Slovenia. The project aimed at (1) providing an account of the number of returnees, along with their competences and needs, (2) introducing joint strategies to promote remigration as a source of innovative enterprise development and (3) developing and implementing services needed to support potential migrants in their wish to return. On the one hand, the project confirmed some of our theoretical assumptions related to the topic (chapter 4.2). Based on a survey that involved about 1,900 respondents, returnees and potential returnees are younger and more qualified than non-migrants or those who stayed abroad; 45% of them are younger than 35 years and 85% of them have at least a tertiary degree, while 28% also hold a PhD. Although the results proved the existence of the phenomenon called the ‘return of failure’, it is true for only about one third of the cases; most migrants return successfully. The return is not so much driven by dissatisfaction with life or economic problems, but mostly by private reasons, e.g. reuniting with family or friends. A remarkable finding is that 40% of the returnees accepted – and nearly the same share of potential would be returnees willing to accept – worse working conditions in favour of an improved social life. According to the classification scheme of the Re-Turn project, most of the returned emigrants are a mixture of the ‘conservative type’ and the ‘family and emotional return type’, while one out of ten of them can be considered an innovator (‘return of innovation’ – CERASE 1974). Nevertheless, almost half of the returnees suffer from labour market reintegration problems and 10% of them are even unemployed. This fact clearly shows a need for intervention, i.e. pro-active regional strategies containing pro-return policies. The Re-Turn project defined four main areas of intervention: general aims (ambassador, hotline, website), re-attraction (PR strategies improving the image of the home region, e.g., through postcards or photo calendars as reminders from home), reintegration (commuters’ day, job portal, recognition of qualifications, reintegration training courses etc.), and re-employment (supporting entrepreneurs in the employment of returnees or supporting returnees who are planning to start their own business).

YMOBILITY (Maximising opportunities for individuals, labour markets and region in Europe) is an ongoing research project, funded by the Horizon 2020 programme, which plans to provide a comprehensive and comparative study of the social, economic and cultural outcomes of youth mobility. The interna-

tional, multidisciplinary scientific investigation relies on primary quantitative and qualitative data (large-scale surveys, interviews) and focuses on 9 European countries, including Romania, Slovakia and Germany. By combining a review of existing policy initiatives with a number of case studies, its main objective will be to understand how different types of youth mobility contribute to stocks of lifelong skills and competences in different regions, and how individuals would respond to contrasting future migration scenarios (it pays particular attention to return migration as well as the 'urban drift' among returnees).

The purpose of the STYLE project is to analyse the obstacles and opportunities affecting youth employment in Europe and assess the effectiveness of labour market policies designed to mitigate youth unemployment. A wide international advisory network and 25 research partners are involved in the project (among the Danube countries these are Germany, Austria, Hungary and Slovakia), which will also examine the European patterns of youth migration, including the labour market outcomes of return migration and integration of young migrants.

Another Horizon 2020 project called MOVE (Mapping mobility – pathways, institutions and structural effects of youth mobility in Europe) is going to provide a comprehensive analysis of youth migration in Europe by creating an integrated quantitative database of European youth mobility (with regard to different forms, conditions and constraints of mobility) and through a number of qualitative case studies.

Aside from the international, cross-disciplinary research projects there are also country-level programmes for the practical implementation of policy frameworks from Costa Rica to the Philippines that usually aim at giving proper responses to the challenges arising from (youth) migration. For instance, the CISP project was designed as a tool to support the development endeavours of Armenia through the active involvement of national civil society organizations and the valorisation of the potential role of the diaspora for the development of the country. Projects financed by the MDG Fund between 2008 and 2012 often targeted underemployed youths and sought to address the challenges of youth migration by integrating employment and social policy objectives into long-term national development goals (e.g. Albania: 'Youth migration: Reaping the benefits and mitigating the risks'). A similar project entitled 'Support to National Efforts for the Promotion of Youth Employment and Management of Migration' tried to tackle youth employment – especially in the case of disadvantaged young people and members of the Romani minority – and reduce the negative impact of irregular migration in Serbia.

Table 5

Previous or ongoing projects related to youth migration  
in the broadest sense

Project name	Key words	Countries involved	Project lifetime	Website
AMICALL – Attitudes to Migrants, Communication and Local Leadership	local authorities' communication activities, attitude toward immigrants, integration of young immigrants	UK, NL, IT, ES, DE, HU	2011 -2012	<a href="http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/project/attitudes-to-migrants-communication-and-local-leadership-amicall/">http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/project/attitudes-to-migrants-communication-and-local-leadership-amicall/</a>
CISP – Maximising the Social and Economic Impact of Migration for a better Future in Armenia	local development, valorisation of the potential role of the diaspora, remittances	AM	2016 -	<a href="http://developmentofpeoples.org/projects/case/559/maximising-the-social-and-economic-impact-of-migration-for-a-better-future">http://developmentofpeoples.org/projects/case/559/maximising-the-social-and-economic-impact-of-migration-for-a-better-future</a>
CoRE – Centre of Refugee Empowerment, Vienna	integration of refugees	AT	2017 -	<a href="http://www.uia-initiative.eu/en/uia-cities/vienna">http://www.uia-initiative.eu/en/uia-cities/vienna</a>
EDUMIGROM – Ethnic Differences in Education and Diverging Prospects for Urban Youth in an Enlarged Europe	second-generation young migrants, Romani people, educational practices and policies, marginalization, social exclusion	UK, SE, FR, DK, CZ, DE, SK, HU, RO	2008 - 2011	<a href="http://www.edumigrom.eu/">http://www.edumigrom.eu/</a>
EUMARGINS – On the Margins of the European Community. Young Adult Immigrants in seven European Countries	young adult immigrants, social inclusion/exclusion, education, labour market	NO, SE, UK, IT, FR, ES, EE	2008 - 2011	<a href="http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/87809_en.html">http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/87809_en.html</a>
GEITONIES – Generating Interethnic Tolerance and Neighbourhood Integration in European Urban Spaces	tolerance, neighborhood integration, social cohesion, intercultural communication	PT, ES, GR, NL, PL, AT	2008 - 2011	<a href="http://geitonies.fl.ul.pt/">http://geitonies.fl.ul.pt/</a>
Generation E – A Data-driven Investigation on South-European Youth Migration	young emigrants, online survey, motivations, destinations, willingness to return	PT, ES, IT, GR	2014 -	<a href="http://www.generatione.eu/en/">http://www.generatione.eu/en/</a>

Project name	Key words	Countries involved	Project lifetime	Website
iYOUTH – Models for Integration and Prevention of Exclusion: Empowering Migrant Youth	youth organizations, integration, prevention of exclusion of young migrants	FR, FI, PL, CZ, AT		<a href="http://www.iomvienna.at/sites/default/files/pictures/iYOUTH_Brochure_EN.pdf">http://www.iomvienna.at/sites/default/files/pictures/iYOUTH_Brochure_EN.pdf</a>
MDG, Albania – Youth migration: Reaping the Benefits and Mitigating the Risks	youth emigration, benefits and risks	AL	2008 - 2012	<a href="http://mdgfund.org/program/youthmigrationreapingbenefitsandmitigatingrisks">http://mdgfund.org/program/youthmigrationreapingbenefitsandmitigatingrisks</a>
MDG, Serbia – Support to National Efforts for the Promotion of Youth Employment and Management of Migration	youth employment, Romani people, youth emigration	RS	2008 - 2012	<a href="http://mdgfund.org/program/supportnationaleffortspromotionyouthemploymentandmanagementmigration">http://mdgfund.org/program/supportnationaleffortspromotionyouthemploymentandmanagementmigration</a>
MOVE – Mapping mobility: Pathways, Institutions and Structural Effects of Youth Mobility in Europe	quantitative database on European youth mobility, qualitative case studies	LU, NO, ES, DE, HU, RO	2015 -	<a href="http://www.move-project.eu/">http://www.move-project.eu/</a>
Re-Turn – Regions Benefitting from Returning Migrants	return migration, tools to foster the return of innovation, support potential remigrants in their wish to return	CZ, IT, PL, DE, AT, SI, HU	2011 -2014	<a href="http://www.re-migrants.eu/">http://www.re-migrants.eu/</a>
SEMIGRA – Selective Migration and Unbalanced Sex Ratio in Rural Regions	selective emigration (young, educated women) from the periphery, policy recommendations	SE, FI, DE, HU	2010 - 2012	<a href="http://www.espon.eu/main/Menu_Projects/Menu_ESPON-2013Projects/Menu_TargetedAnalyses/semigra.html">http://www.espon.eu/main/Menu_Projects/Menu_ESPON-2013Projects/Menu_TargetedAnalyses/semigra.html</a>
SEEMIG – Managing Migration and its Effects in South-East Europe - Transnational Actions Towards Evidence Based Strategies	quantitative research on demography and migration, coherent database, population projections, strategies concerning migration management	AT, BG, HU, IT, RO, RS, SK, SI	2012 - 2014	<a href="http://www.seemig.eu/">http://www.seemig.eu/</a>

## Appendix

Project name	Key words	Countries involved	Project lifetime	Website
STYLE – Strategic Transitions for Youth Labour in Europe	obstacles and opportunities affecting youth employment, youth migration	UK, IE, DK, NO, SE, BE, FR, IT, GR, ES, EE, POL, CZ, AT, DE, SK, HU, TR	2014 -	<a href="http://www.style-research.eu/project/">http://www.style-research.eu/project/</a>
TIES – The Integration of the European Second Generation	integration, second generation, large-scale survey	BE, NL, UK, FR, CH, ES, SE, FR, DE, AT	2003 - 2009	<a href="http://www.tiesproject.eu/">http://www.tiesproject.eu/</a>
TRESEGY – Toward a Social Construction of an European Youth-Ness: Experience of Inclusion and Exclusion in the Public Sphere among Second Generation Migrated Teenagers	European youthness, second generation of teenagers, inclusion/exclusion	IT, ES, PT, FR, NL, DE	2006 - 2009	<a href="http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/78678_en.html">http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/78678_en.html</a>
YMOBILITY – Maximising Opportunities for Individuals, Labour Markets and Regions in Europe	quantitative research on youth mobility, large-scale survey, policy analysis, individuals' responses to different scenarios of economic and social change	UK, SE, IE, IT, ES, LV, SK, RO	2014 -	<a href="http://www.ymobility.eu/">http://www.ymobility.eu/</a>
YOUNGANG – Gangs Policies: Youth and Migration in Local Contexts	gangs, violent riots, young migrants and second generations, segregation, new gang and youth policy	ES	2011 - 2013	<a href="http://cordis.europa.eu/result/rcn/144561_en.html">http://cordis.europa.eu/result/rcn/144561_en.html</a>
YURA – Your Region Your Future	youth emigration from rural areas, lets pupils get acquainted with local career perspectives, cooperation between schools and local companies	PL, CZ, IT, DE, AT, HU	2011 - 2013	<a href="http://www.yura-project.eu/">http://www.yura-project.eu/</a>

## Glossary

*Age-specific migration:* Migration is a selective process, e.g. b: people at a young age and with a higher education have a higher risk to be mobile. Phases of the lifecourse are (due to structural and biological features) effecting mobility behaviour, e.g.: the age-specific distribution of migrants peaks at the age when they complete their secondary education (when leaving school between 16 and 20 years of age in most European countries), when they begin tertiary education or when they enter or exit the labour market. Young children also show a higher mobility when family migration occurs.

*Brain circulation:* In contrast to the oversimplified way of using ‘brain drain’ and ‘brain gain’ as antonyms, international labour migration is more often circular. This phenomenon enables transnational social networks to emerge and encourages the transfer of skills and know-how. Brain circulation can be seen as opportunity to reduce the negative effects of brain drain.

*Brain drain:* The loss of people through emigration influences the net human capital of a country. In most of the countries the share of highly qualified people among emigrants is higher than the compared share measured in the total population, which is why outmigration is often understood as the loss of high-skilled people or in more colloquial terms as ‘brain drain’.

*Brain gain:* The inflow of young and skilled workers can result in brain gain (i.e. gain of innovation) and indirectly in economic growth and productivity. Today, the influx and development of knowledge is deeply connected with the theory of human capital.

## Glossary

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*Brain waste and overqualification:* Describes the employment of high-skilled migrants in low-skilled jobs due to the limited international transferability of skills, a high income-differential between countries or regions and the segmentation of labour markets. It causes substantial economic costs and can reduce education incentives, weaken the chances for positive self-selection and decrease the possibility of 'real' brain gain.

*Circular migration:* The fluid movement of people between countries. This includes temporary and long-term movement which may be beneficial to all involved, if they occur voluntarily and are linked to the labour needs of the countries of origin and destination.

*Danube region:* The Danube region in the sense of the European Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) comprises 14 'Danube countries'. Nine of them are members of the European Union (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), two are candidate countries (Montenegro and Serbia) and three are third countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldavia and Ukraine). Not all countries are entirely included in the Danube region. In Germany, only the two federal states of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg are considered part of the region. In Ukraine, only the oblasti Odessa, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk and Chernivtsi are included.

*Development:* Development has undergone a change of definition in the last decades. Whereas before it was mainly considered in a fiscal and economic dimension, today it is also connected to education and factors of well-being. Migration and development are strongly interconnected. Since migration is a selective process that is mostly undertaken by young and educated people it is generally recognized as a flow of human capital. There are different theoretical perspectives on the interconnection of migration and development. For example, neoclassical theories suggest that increasing socio-economic development in sending communities – or decreasing developmental differences between sending and receiving communities – could reduce massive outflows from sending communities. In contrast, advocates of historical structuralism, who emphasize structural imbalance and cumulative causation, state that developmental differences would deepen between sending regions and destinations and ultimately lead to even higher levels of emigration. Since the millennium, many researchers have turned their attention to the conditions under

which migration brings about higher development in sending countries. They have begun studying migrants and transnational migrant communities as 'development agents' responsible for the development of their home communities.

*Diaspora:* The term 'diaspora' was originally used to denote religious or national groups living outside of an (imagined) homeland. Today, the concept of diaspora refers to a group of people with a shared community feeling that often refers to a cultural distinctiveness of the diaspora vis-à-vis other groups. From a wider perspective, today, citizenship is regarded as recognizing diaspora communities in different countries. The concept of diaspora refers to a community or group that is engaged in activities (such as poverty alleviation, development projects) in their sending states or tries to preserve cultural traditions (festivities, languages).

*Diaspora policies:* A growing number of governments have been recognizing that their diaspora can contribute to the development of their home countries through remittances, financial investments as well as through the transfer of knowledge and skills. Today, more than half of the UN member states have their own diaspora department, yet 'diaspora policies' have very different priorities. In order to attract diaspora investment, six specific measures can be identified worldwide: (1) tax exemption or breaks, (2) reduction of tariffs on goods or import duties for diaspora companies, (3) preferential treatment for providing credit, (4) preferential treatment for the allotment of licences, (5) streamlined bureaucratic procedures for investment and (6) diaspora bonds or mutual funds.

*Emigrant:* A person undertaking an emigration (Regulation (EC) No 862/2007).

*Emigration:* The act by which a person usually residing in a state territory ceases to have his or her usual residence in that state for an estimated period of at least 12 months. (Derived from Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 modified.)

*Family migration:* Originally, the term 'family migration' was used as a general concept covering family reunification and the migration of a family unit as a whole. In the last few years new forms of families emerging (e.g. single mothers and fathers, patchwork families, families without children, cohabitating couples

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and same-sex couples) have become more frequent and therefore relevant and therefore the idea of family migration became wider. Partnership formation, marriage and childbearing usually happen in the transitional phase from youth to adulthood and have a great impact on choosing a place of residence and therefore also on migration. Further, migration can indirectly affect families, when, e.g., individual members of a union change their residency, which leads to transnational families or partnerships or leaving families behind. The focus of family migration was recently broadened by taking into account how migration affects family members who do not migrate.

*Immigrant:* A person undertaking an immigration. (Regulation (EC) No 862/2007)

*Immigration:* The act by which a person establishes his or her usual residence in the territory of a state for an estimated period of at least 12 months, after having previously been a usual resident of another state. (Derived from Regulation (EC) No 862/2007)

*Integration:* The term is used and understood differently in different contexts. In our case it refers to the process by which immigrants become accepted into society, i.e. a specific type of incorporation. The state is assumed to play an active role in helping the immigrants become a part of society, and the majority group is assumed to allow such an inclusion. In the integration model of minority policies, immigrants are expected to adopt some part of the hosts' practices and cultural patterns without abandoning their original culture. Unlike assimilation, this is a bidirectional process, in which the hosts also adopt certain habits of the immigrants (Budyta-Budzyńska 2009).

*Internal migration:* The movement of people from one area of a country to another area of the same country for the purpose or with the effect of establishing a new residence. This type of migration can be temporary or permanent. Internal migrants move but remain within their country of origin (e.g. rural to urban migration).

*International migration:* International migration involves the crossing of an international border.

*Labour migration:* Migrating to another country for the purpose of employment can be undertaken in order to a) find a manual labour job which mainly requires physical strength, b) find a job that requires secondary-level education as well as specific qualifications and experience (typically jobs, e.g., in mechanics or health care), c) accept a job that requires lower skills than the migrant actually has but that are not recognized or cannot be used due to language barriers, d) learn on the job and improve one's qualifications and e) have a career in a high-skilled job market.

*Labour migrants* can therefore be divided into *highly skilled/qualified labour migrants* and *lower skilled labour migrants*. In very general terms a highly skilled migrant is considered a person with tertiary education, typically an adult who has completed at least two years of post-secondary education. In the Danube region different wage levels often play a crucial role in deciding to migrate. Wage differentials might attract *target earners*, who take on employment for a certain period of time in order to prepare their transition into family union by being able to buy, build or renovate a house or an apartment after returning from their employment abroad. In many cases higher-skilled migration is not only linked to economic factors and therefore comparable with international student mobility, in which the search for adventure, new experiences, learning a language, escaping the norms of the domestic society and lifestyle factors are almost as important as economic factors such as high salaries and better employment opportunities. Aside from *career seekers*, so-called *drifters* (who migrate mainly to travel and live in a global city) are a type of high-skilled migrant.

*Life course:* The term is used to denote the process of personal change from birth to infancy, childhood and adulthood up to old age and death. It is the result of the interaction between biological and biographical events on the one hand and social events on the other. Although every individual life follows its own individual course and changes of residency are driven by different motivations within the age group of 15-34, systematic principles can be found in the timing of events during the youth phase. Migration is influenced by micro-, meso- and macro-level factors, which can also be understood as factors and events structuring the life course. For instance, the start of tertiary education or vocational training is mainly pre-defined by legal requirements such as compulsory schooling.

*Life course transitions triggering mobility:* There are three significant life course transitions that occur at a young age that trigger mobility: the transition from school or higher education to work, the transition from unemployment to employment and the transition from living at home to living independently. The latter transition describes the establishment of one's own 'home', which is often connected with partnership formation or having children, and it is the last transition before adulthood. The three transitions can be generally seen to subsequently follow each other, although not every young person necessarily will go through all transitions.

*Long-term immigrant:* A person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year (12 months). Consequently, the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence. From the perspective of the country of departure the person will be a long-term emigrant and from that of the country of arrival the person will be a long-term immigrant. (UN 1998)

*Migrant (international):* Refers to an *immigrant* and *emigrant*

*Migration:* Longer-term relocation of individuals' main place of residence. Two defining variables of international migration are relevant in this context: spatial distance and duration of time. The majority of definitions of international migration include these two features but differ significantly in terms of their specific use. The United Nations (UN) (1998: 17) recommends defining an international migrant as 'any person who changes his or her country of usual residence'. To make a clear distinction between international visitors and international migrants, the UN recommends further, with regard to the time variable, that the change of country of usual residence must involve a period of stay in the country of destination for at least one year (12 months) in order to become an international migrant. In the regulations of the European Commission (EC) the term 'usual residence' is referred to as the place "at which a person normally spends the daily period of rest, regardless of temporary absence for purposes of recreation, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage or, in default, the place of legal or registered residence" (EC 2007). The Commission also considers a period of 12 months a defining criterion of immigration and emigration.

*Migration policy:* In the past, control of migration implied control of emigration. Today, it is included in the legal framework of receiving countries. The recognition of the demand for a labour force marks an important shift in the perception of immigration in the early twenty-first century. Aside from active recruitment of a legal foreign labour force or the admission of temporary foreign workers, integrational measures have been subsumed under migration policies since approximately the 1970s. Migration presents a cross-cutting topic because of its multiple consequences. Taking into account both the countries of origin and the countries of destination, almost all major policy fields are in some way affected by migration.

*Mobility:* Mobility is used as a wider concept than migration and includes also other forms of spatial mobility such as (cross-border) commuting or multi-local living (maintaining two households in two different settlements or even countries at the same time).

*Mode of entry:* Different degrees of border permeability (EU borders, Schengen area, new EU member states and third countries). Not all movements within the Danube region have the same juridical consequences. Moreover, the perception of 'internal' and 'international' migration has also changed over time as a consequence of the turbulent history of the territory, e.g. the fall of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Despite our main focus on international migration patterns within the Danube region, we are aware that other forms of mobility also occur such as commuting, internal migration, irregular migration, asylum transit migration and so forth. Apart from *regular migration* (EU internal migration, asylum migration, third country migration with specific visa regulations) there are also *irregular migration* movements that take place outside of the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries.

*Net migration/Migration balance:* The difference between immigration to and emigration from a specific area during the year (net migration is therefore negative when the number of emigrants exceeds the number of immigrants). (Eurostat Glossary on Demographic Statistics)

*Push and pull model:* According to this migration model all people can be considered potential migrants, if the living conditions elsewhere are better than in the current place of residence and the cost for migration is lower than the

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gain which migration can bring. Push factors are circumstances that make it unattractive for an individual to live in a certain place (unemployment, low wages etc.), while pull factors (higher income, a favourable job, business opportunities etc.) make another place more attractive.

*Remittance*: Transfers made by emigrants to the country of origin. Whereas remittances are commonly understood to be money transfers (*economic remittances*), remittances also refer to *social remittances*, *technological remittances* and *political remittances*.

*Return migration*: Up until the 1960s only little attention was paid to the topic of return migration. Migration was seen as a one-directional process, ending with the final decision to emigrate. During the onset of the economic recession in the 1970s, further scientific contributions appeared that addressed the issue of returning guest workers. Recent studies have concentrated on the beneficial role of return migrants on economic development as well as the effects of integration and transnationalism on the decision of whether to go home or not. Aside from the simple distinction between immigration and emigration other forms of mobility are also observable such as transilient migration, re-emigration, second-time emigration and circular or seasonal migration.

*Second generation*: The term usually refers to the children of foreign-born immigrants. Although the term is misleading (they were born in the country their parents had previously moved to, thus they are not 'immigrants' in a proper sense), the expression is very popular even in the social sciences. Since the integration process can span several generations, the 'second generation' faces specific challenges of integration. They very often experience a higher employment probability than immigrants due to the latter's lack of networks, limited knowledge of the labour market and facing discrimination. The statistical offices use different definitions for 'people with a migration background' and ask about the birthplace of at least one or both parents.

The term "*1.5 generation*" needs to be mentioned in the context of the second generation. It refers to individuals who immigrate to a country before or during their early teens. 'In-between' or '1.5 generation' individuals bring with them or maintain characteristics from their home country. They usually find it

easier to integrate into local society and very often become bilingual persons with hybrid identities.

*Short-time migrant:* The UN defines a short-time migrant as “a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least 3 months but less than a year (12 months) except in cases where the movement to that country is for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends and relatives, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage.

*Social cohesion:* The “ongoing process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunity (...), based on a sense of trust, hope and reciprocity” (PRI 1999). In scientific investigations social cohesion is often described and operationalized with the strength of social relations, mutual trust among societal members, solidarity, civic engagement, feelings of a common identity, a sense of belonging to the same community and so forth. As JENSON (1998) summarized: a feeling of belonging, inclusion, participation, recognition, and legitimacy are the five widely considered dimensions of social cohesion.

*Student migration:* International students are typically enrolled in tertiary education (university, colleges or similar institutions) but international migration of secondary school students is also possible (especially in border regions). University students can be differentiated in terms of ‘credit mobility’ (students who only take individual courses or experience only several semesters abroad) or in terms of ‘degree or diploma mobility’ (students who go abroad for a whole study programme, such as a master’s degree or a doctorate). Education-oriented migrants are not easy to identify and follow statistically, since there are different subtypes and insufficient statistical data sources. Defining an international student can be difficult because citizenship, birthplace or prior residency cannot be sufficiently identified. Furthermore, most students do not consider themselves migrants and also fail to register themselves, even if their study visit takes longer than 3 months, which would be counted as a short-time migration according to the definition of the UN.

*Subjective well-being:* The expression refers to a person’s own assessment of his or her happiness and satisfaction with life. Although many researchers use the terms ‘welfare’, ‘satisfaction’ and ‘well-being’ synonymously, in fact

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SWB is an umbrella-term which includes life satisfaction as well as positive and negative effects (a combination of positive and negative emotions and feelings) (SELEZNEVA 2016). Measuring well-being is an alternative to traditional measurements of wealth and is one of the key priorities of the OECD. During the last decades researchers introduced a number of new indices based on SWB (e.g. the Better Life Index) as alternatives to GDP.

*Transnational mobility:* The fluid form of migrating between two places and never really leaving one or arriving at the other has gained attention under the name of ‘transnational mobility’. It has become more prevalent due to a higher permeability of national borders, the emergence of transnational communities, whose identity is not primarily based on attachment to a specific territory, permanent economic inequalities and technological advances in communication and transport.

*Triple win:* The triple-win concept claims that it is desirable and possible to implement migration programmes that are mutually beneficial for migrants, sending countries and destination countries. Diaspora policies and other forms of regulation (e.g. mobility partnerships) created by governments worldwide point in this direction. This is a debated topic in contemporary social sciences, and critics claim that this expectation is naïve because migration cannot be a zero-sum game.

*Youth:* There is no universal definition since the term ‘youth’ is a cultural construct linked to societal norms and values. The term varies greatly throughout history and in different regions of the world. Generally, the transition from childhood to youth begins with puberty and ends with the transition to adulthood. However, it is not easy to determine when these phases begin. For the YOUMIG project we needed a proxy variable based on statistical data and have thus defined ‘youth’ as persons aged between 15-34 years. This definition includes all possible transitions throughout the life course that are relevant for youth migration.

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